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As the originator of the most ambitious programme of social
legislation to be enacted in Canada to his time, Prime Minister Bennett
incurred more than his share of criticism from his contemporaries.
His political enemies interpreted the 'New Deal' as a last, desperate
attempt to avoid the electoral defeat presaged by a series of by-
election reverses in 1934 and 1935 and the inability of Bennett's gov-
ernment to lead Canada out of the depression. The feeble legislative
aftermath of his five apocalyptic radio broadcasts of January, 1935,
moreover, reinforced the criticism of those who were sceptical of the
Prime Minister's claim that he would refashion overnight the whole
capitalist system, making it the servant, rather than the oppressor, of
the Canadian people. Subsequent historians have generally deprecated
the gulf between Bennett's grandiose promises and their inadequate
implementation.1 Nevertheless, despite its shortcomings, in an era of
*While assuming sole responsibility for the contents of this article, the
writer wishes to express his deep gratitude to Professor Peter H. Russell of
the Department of Political Economy, University of Toronto, who super-
vised the Ph.D. dissertation on which it is based.
tW. H. McConnell, B.A. (Carleton University), B.C.L. (University of NewBrunswick), M.A. (University of Ottawa), Ph.D. (University of Toronto), is
an Assistant Professor of Political Science at Bishop's University.
1 See e.g., A. LOWER, COLONY TO NATION (4th ed., Toronto, 1964) 521, and
R. Cooic, J. SAYWELL and 3. RicKER, CANADA: A MODERN STUDY (Toronto, 1963)
203-204.
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laissez-faire the New Deal did represent the most significant attempt
to its time (1934-35) to mitigate adverse economic conditions.
The disjointedness and incoherence of the New Deal-its lack of
unity or system-is attributable to Bennett's notorious penchant for
one-man rule. As his Minister of Railways and Canals, Hon. R. J.
Manion, and others have disclosed,2 the social reform programme was
never submitted to cabinet or caucus before it was formally launched
in Bennett's broadcasts. The principal instigators of the programme
were Bennett's brother-in-law, Hon. W. D. Herridge, who as Canadian
Minister to Washington was able to observe closely the operation of
Roosevelt's New Deal, Major-General A. G. L. McNaughton, Chief of
the General Staff (1929-1935), and to a somewhat lesser extent R. K.
Finlayson, Bennett's executive secretary. These three associates of
Bennett collaborated in writing the New Deal radio speeches at
Herridge's cottage at Lake Mousseau in the Gatineau, with Herridge
completing the final drafts. Herridge, indeed, had written a long series
of letters to his brother-in-law, urging him to inaugurate a Canadian
version of Roosevelt's New Deal to restore morale and revitalize the
economy. In Herridge's opinion, it was not so much the legislation
itself which would be the instrumental factor in recovery as it was
the resurgence of confidence, especially in the business community,
which would accompany the legislation. For this very reason it was
necessary, according to Herridge, to 'sell' the programme to the Cana-
dian people by a vigorous propaganda campaign waged at the same
time the statutes were enacted.
The refusal of Bennett to share responsibility in the formulation
of the New Deal with others, arising from his severe temporary
incapacity from diabetes and heart trouble in the Spring of 1935,
retarded the articulation of the legislation. Sir George Perley, the
Acting Prime Minister, knew little of the actual details of the pro-
gramme, although he loyally led what legislation there was through
the House of Commons. Herridge and McNaughton, as helpless on-
lookers, were almost distraught at the anticlimactic nature of the
statutes which were enacted. The legislative sequel made Bennett's
pretentions in his January broadcasts farcical.
After a landslide Liberal victory in the general election of Octo-
ber 14, 1935, Mackenzie King was faced with the problem of what to
do with his predecessor's New Deal. To some extent, the New Deal
had been framed as a defiant political manifesto by which Bennett
and Herridge had hoped to rejuvenate and create a fresh and 'pro-
gressive' image for the Tories. They had hoped thereby to discredit
a postulated Liberal attitude of laissez-faire, and to fashion a political
coalition comprised of all those elements favouring government inter-
vention in the economy as a nostrum for the depression. Thinking,
2 Memorandum by Manion, January 3, 1935, Manion Papers (Public
Archives of Canada), and Memorandum by Manion, n.d., written on the back
of a September, 1933, calendar leaf. id.
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perhaps, that to carry on with the reform programme would be a
servile admission of their own past failures,3 the Prime Minister and
the Minister of Justice, Ernest Lapointe, decided as almost the first
act of the new administration to seek references on the constitutional
validity of Bennett's New Deal. They were not 'in principle' opposed
to the legislation, but they constantly reiterated that the whole pro-
gramme probably constituted a federal encroachment on the juris-
diction of the provinces. They considered it necessary, therefore,
before proceeding further with the programme, to send the New Deal
statutes to the Supreme Court of Canada to obtain a legal opinion on
their validity.
Although many writers have ably examined the New Deal refer-
ences, not much attention has yet been focussed on the interaction of
law and politics in the litigation. In view of the heated political con-
frontation over the New Deal, some attempt should be made to place
the decisions in a broader political context than has so far been
attempted. Accordingly, after a brief examination of the statutes
themselves, such extra-legal factors will be examined below as: the
political decision to send the reform programme to the courts to test
its validity; the political background (in its broadest connotation) of
the judges on the Supreme Court of Canada; the political influences
that might have exerted a compelling pressure on the Court; and the
general considerations of a policy rather than the strictly legal issues
which may have been influential in shaping the decisions. In con-
clusion, the ultimate disposition of the references by the Judicial
Committee will be briefly examined. In light of the above factors, it
will be argued that extra-legal influences had an important bearing
on the result of the references.
The New Deal Statutes
The eight New Deal statutes sent for judicial review fall into
three broad categories: (1) the treaty legislation, i.e. three pieces of
labour legislation implementing conventions prepared by the Inter-
national Labour Organization, and the unemployment insurance
statute which was originally conceived as a treaty statute; (2) the
price spreads legislation, emanating from Hon. H. H. Stevens's Royal
Commission on price spreads 4 and comprising The Dominion Trade
and Industry Commission Act and Section 498A of the Criminal Code,
and (3) the earlier legislation, enacted before the New Deal was for-
mally announced and having for its purpose the assistance of farmers,
fishermen, lumbermen and non-urban workers, consisting of the
Natural Products Marketing Act and the Farmers' Creditors Arrange-
ment Act.
3 Clauses 3, 4 and 5 of the Liberal Platform of 1919 committed the
Liberals to minimum wage, minimum hours of labour and weekly day of restlegislation similar to that enacted by Bennett in 1935 as part of the New Deal.
See RESoLUTioNs ADoPTED BY THE NATIONAL LIBERAL CONvEiTIoN IN OTTAWA
ON AUGUST 5, 6 AND 7, 1919, (Ottawa, 1919).
4 CANADA, ROYAL COMMISSION ON PRICE SPREADs, REPORT, (Ottawa, 1937).
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Before proceeding to survey the relevant political and legal in-
fluences affecting the New Deal, it would be in order briefly to
examine the policy orientation of the different statutes as well as
some of the constitutional problems that they presented to the courts.
The Treaty Legislation: One of the most contentious parts of the
New Deal involved the three statutes enacted in 1935 pursuant to
conventions of the I.L.O. The Limitation of Hours of Work Act,5 the
Weekly Rest in Industrial Undertakings Act,6 and the Minimum Wages
Act 7 were designed to implement enlightened labour standards estab-
lished by the General Conference of the International Labour Organi-
zation further to the Labour provisions of the Treaty of Peace.8 In
the Canadian context, a goal common to each piece of legislation was
to have nation-wide uniform standards in labour matters. Supporters
of the legislation contended that if labour laws were enacted piece-
meal by various provincial governments, some provinces would have
lower standards than others with the result that workers in those
provinces would constitute a relatively underprivileged group. It was
argued that only the federal government could enact legislation of a
sufficiently comprehensive character to regulate labour standards
across the Dominion as a whole.
The Limitation of Hours of Work Act provided that no person
should be employed in an industrial undertaking for hours "in excess
of eight in the day and forty-eight in the week except in cases herein-
before provided for."9 (Exemptions were provided for in cases of
urgency, vis major, family undertakings or where exceptional work
pressures existed.) The Weekly Rest in Industrial Undertakings Act
required that a period of at least twenty-four consecutive hours was
to be provided in any seven-day period for "the whole of the staff
employed in any industrial undertaking."' 0 While the Minimum Wages
Act did not set a comprehensive minimum wage for all industrial
undertakings, it did provide that the Governor in Council might estab-
lish machinery to set minimum wages in rateable trades; the Gover-
nor in Council could also declare what a "rateable trade" was. The
purpose of the statute was to ensure that no industrial worker re-
ceived remuneration insufficient to meet basic living costs.
Provincial spokesmen were quick to point out that in enacting
these statutes Parliament was purporting to regulate the terms of
industrial contracts, the great majority of which had formerly been
held to fall under the provincial head of 'property and civil rights.'
They also invoked a 1925 reference decision" of the Supreme Court
5 25-26 Geo. V, 1935, c. 63.
6 25-26 Geo. V, 1935, c. 14.
7 25-26 Geo. V, 1935, c. 44.
8 See Part XIII of the TREATY OF PEACE BETwEEN TEE ALLIED AmD Asso-




11 Hours of Labour Reference, [19251 S.C.R. 505.
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of Canada on the unratified Hours of Work convention in which
Mr. Justice Duff (as he then was) had held that, except for certain
federal employees or in federally-administered territories, the subject-
matter of the convention fell under provincial jurisdiction.
It was M/fr. Bennett's intention to have the three above-mentioned
labour conventions ratified by Canada and enacted under the treaty-
implementing power (section 132 of the B.N.A. Act) or, alternatively,
(and in a distinctly subordinate place in the argument) under the
residuary clause. It was probably hoped thereby to strengthen the
claim that the three statutes had been validly enacted.
Unemployment Insurance: The Employment and Social Insurance
Act 12 also related to the industrial community and was originally
framed as a treaty statute. As with the I.L.O, statutes, the preamble
of this Act invoked Articles 23 and 427 of the Treaty of Peace as
authority for its enactment and the first few lines of all statutes
were textually identical. Unlike the I.L.O. statutes, however, it did
not proceed to invoke a specific convention ratified by Canada and
empowering the federal government to enact its provisions. Where
the other statutes go on to do this, it merely spoke generally of
Canada's "obligations" under the Treaty. According to R. K. Finlay-
son,13 Bennett's executive secretary, the first draft Bill on unemploy-
ment insurance did refer to a relevant convention, but Bennett him-
self ordered the reference struck out since he feared that its presence
would incite J. S. Woodsworth, the C.C.F. leader, to press vigorously
in Parliament for the appropriation of relief assistance (associated
with unemployment insurance in I.L.O. conventions) by the federal
government. Bennett felt that there were definite limits to what the
federal government could do to assist the unemployed, and he did
not want to be placed on the defensive by gratuitously invoking the
mentioned convention. The difficulty was, of course, that without an
express reference to a specific convention, there was little foundation
for enacting the statute as treaty legislation.
The Act provided, inter alia, that workers who had contributed
25 cents weekly for forty weeks and who were subsequently capable
of and available for work, but who were unable to find employment,
would be paid an indemnity of $6 weekly for a period of 78 days. The
statute did not purport to be all-inclusive as various classes of sea-
sonal and other workers could not participate in the scheme, and it
was naturally of no assistance to the large numbers of unemployed
during the depression. By its own terms it could cover only a portion
of those needing unemployment assistance, leaving the remainder to
rely on local relief or charity.
The constitutional problem presented by the statute was whether
unemployment insurance was like any other type of insurance and
thus a matter of contract falling under section 92 (13), or whether as
"social insurance", it was an insurance sui generis not subject to
12 25-26 Geo. V, 1935, c. 38.
13 Mr. Finlayson supplied the writer with much helpful information on
the New Deal in the course of two interviews early in 1966.
1968]
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
classification with commercial insurance contracts. In the latter case,
it might be argued that (despite the precedents conferring jurisdic-
tion over commercial insurance on the provinces) nation-wide social
need would enable the government to enact the new species of social
insurance under the residuary clause. The answer to this question
could well depend on the extent to which the judiciary were willing
to consider sociological factors, in addition to strictly legal ones,
before rendering their judgments.
The Price Spreads Legislation: Section 498A of the Criminal
Code14 and the Dominion Trade and Industry Commission Act1 5
emanated from the celebrated price spreads enquiry headed by Hon.
H. H. Stevens towards the end of Bennett's term of office. (Stevens
resigned his trade and commerce portfolio in October, 1934, and
formed the Reconstruction Party in July, 1935, charging that Ben-
nett's implementation of the Report's recommendations was grossly
inadequate.) The price spreads legislation was designed to penalize
various commercial abuses which were particularly prevalent during
the depression.
The Criminal Code amendment prohibited discriminatory dis-
counts, rebates and allowances, or predatory price-cutting. The Domin-
ion Trade and Industry Commission Act brought into being a Commis-
sion with extensive supervisory powers over other statutes regulating
trade practices such as the Combines Investigation Act. In effect, the
Act was to be a master statute invoking all the powers at the disposal
of the government so that unfair trade practices would be eliminated
and fair merchandising and high commodity standards be promoted.
In connection with the latter objective, the use of a federal trademark
"Canada Standard" (C.S.) was authorized under sections 18 and 19 of
the Act. The Commissioners, who were to be the members of the
Tariff Board for the time being, were directed to receive and investi-
gate complaints concerning fair trade practices. If satisfied that the
practice complained of contravened federal law, they could recommend
that a prosecution be instituted against the persons responsible.
Constitutionally, the most questionable provision in the legisla-
tion was section 14 of the Dominion Trade and Industry Commission
Act allowing industrialists to modify competition wherever it was
deemed to be "wasteful or demoralizing" by agreeing to control prices
and production throughout the affected industry. The issue was
whether such regulation was a valid exercise of the federal trade and
commerce power, or whether, by regulating the terms of local con-
tracts, it fell under the provincial head of property and civil rights.
The Earlier Legislation: There might be some question concern-
ing whether the Farmers' Creditors Arrangement Act 16 and the Nat-
ural Products Marketing Act 17 should be classified as New Deal stat-
utes at all. R. K. Finlayson is emphatic that, like unemployment in-
14 S. 9 of 25-26 Geo. V, c. 56.
15 25-26 Geo. V, c. 59.
16 24-25 Geo. V, 1934, c. 53.
17 24-25 Geo. V, 1934, c. 57.
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surance, they were conceived and developed before the Prime Minister
decided to launch a New Deal. They would certainly have existed in-
dependently of the New Deal, whatever its fate had been. However, as
they shared with the other New Deal statutes the social purpose of im-
proving the fortunes of those hardest hit by the depression, and as
they were sent for judicial review by the victorious Liberals in 1935,
they may be regarded as New Deal statutes despite their earlier and
independent origin. Both statutes sought to help non-urban workers
to mitigate the effects of the depression. It should be mentioned that
the plight of the prairie farmers was particularly hard as drought had
coincided with depression in the three prairie provinces.
The underlying premise of the Farmers' Creditors Arrangement
Act was that it was in the public interest to keep debt-ridden farmers
on their land even if they could not meet their debts as they became
due. Accordingly, at the option of the farmer, the statute made avail-
able a compulsory mechanism whereby he could negotiate a comprom-
ise of principal and interest payments with his creditors on both
secured and unsecured loans. Farmers who could not meet their accru-
ing liabilities could propose "a composition, extension of time or
scheme of arrangement" to their creditors which, if accepted, would
be referred to a distinct or superior court for registration. Once regis-
tered, the proposal was a legally enforceable variation of the original
contract of loan or purchase. Should the creditors decline to agree to
the scheme proposed, the farmer could apply to a provincial board of
review (usually comprised of local members of the judiciary) who
were empowered to formulate an alternative proposal which could be
enforced whether approved by the creditors or not.
The Natural Products Marketing Act provided means for pro-
ducers of defined natural products to adopt marketing schemes, which
were legally binding on all producers within a specific geographic area,
to improve marketing and distribution methods for their produce. By
adopting more efficient marketing practices it was thought that the
unduly large discrepancy between the primary producers' selling price
and the ultimate consumers' buying price might be reduced, affording
such producers a larger share of the ultimate selling price of their
products. Producers, mainly of farm, fish and forest products, could
organize on their own initiative on a local, provincial or national level
provided that they satisfied the Governor in Council that a "repre-
sentative number" of producers of a defined commodity wished to par-
ticipate in a marketing scheme. The Dominion Marketing Board exer-
cised over-all control of marketing under the statute, but provision was
also made for local boards. One of the characteristic goals of market-
ing schemes was to ensure that an adequate supply of produce reached
their markets under the Board's jurisdiction so that conditions of arti-
ficial glut or scarcity would not affect prices. Complementary legisla-
tion was enacted by all nine provinces so that both intra-provincial
and inter-provincial and export marketing would be covered. Historic-
ally, one of the most vexing problems confronting legislative draftsmen
was the articulation of marketing legislation (in both its intra-provin-
1968]
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cial and extra-provincial aspects) which would be both comprehensive
and constitutionally valid.18 Before this statute was invalidated by the
courts, a large number of marketing schemes were inaugurated in
different industries and with varying degrees of success. 19
As in the case of several of the other statutes, one of the issues
in both of the above-mentioned Acts was whether there was an uncon-
stitutional attempt by Ottawa to regulate purely local transactions. In
purporting to modify mortgages of homesteads, or to facilitate intra-
provincial marketing transactions, the federal government might well
be accused of encroaching on provincial jurisdiction.
The Initiation of the References
When the Liberals were elected on October 14, 1935, with a sub-
stantial parliamentary majority, they had the power necessary to do
with the New Deal whatever they desired. The only restraints upon
their action would be prudential ones based upon an appraisal of public
reaction to their possible repudiation of the New Deal. Since the
Conservatives had been decisively rejected by the electorate, how-
ever, in an election in which the New Deal was an issue, the manner
in which the victors dealt with Mr. Bennett's reform programme
would not seem to have caused the victors much anxiety.
It should be mentioned that the reference of the New Deal
programme to the courts was only one of a series of options con-
fronting the new government in its disposition of the programme.
If it was reluctant to proceed with the implementation of the whole
programme it could, for example, implement the statutes selectively,
or even repeal the statutes. It could also leave the statutes on the
books but refuse to implement them. Or, alternatively, it could either
refer the statutes to the courts itself, or prepare for a provincial
challenge to the legislation through provincial reference procedures.20
The New Deal statutes might be placed in issue at any time, of course,
by concerned individuals in the more common type of adversary
process.
In deciding to employ a reference, the excutive were selecting
one mechanism from among several by which the social reform
programme could be tested. The reference did, however, possess a
singular advantage in that it enabled the executive to shift the burden
of responsibility for the disposition of the New Deal, at least tempor-
18 See J. A. Corry, Difficulties of Divided Jurisdiction, Appendix 7, ROYAL
CommissIoN o DOMnmiON-PRovNCIAL RuLATioNs, (King's Printer, Ottawa,
1939) esp. pp. 11-13.
19 See R. B. HANsoN, THE DovIoN MARiETImNG BoARD AND THE I oR-
TANT WORK IT HAS Do 'E (Ottawa, June 12, 1935), Meighen Papers, (P.A.C.),
and W. C. Hopper, The Natural Products Marketing Act 1934, II: Notes on
the Administration of the Act, in the (1935) 1:3 CANADIAN JoURNAL OF Eco-
NOMICS AND POLITIcAL SCIENCE.
20 The provincial reference power could well have been used to ascertain
the validity of the New Deal statutes had the federal government shown
reticence in seeking references. Of. R.S.N.S., 1954, c. 50; R.S.P.E.L, 1951, c. 79;
R.S.N.B., c. 120, s. 24A; R.S.Q., 1941, c. 8; R.S. Man., 1954, c. 44; R.S. Sask.,
1953, c. 18; R.S. Alta., c. 55, 1955, and R.S.B.C., 1948, c. 66.
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arily, from itself to the judiciary, and to gain time to devise alternative
modes of procedure should the programme be upheld. However con-
venient the reference device might be in the short run, it should be
remembered that there were also dangers accompanying its use. In
a New Deal type situation it could result in a drastic curtailment of
federal constitutional powers if the judiciary found a wide-ranging
social reffor m programme to be ultra vires. Ottawa might find that
in securing a temporary advantage through the employment of a
reference, it had tied its hands as far as future social initiatives of a
similar kind were concerned. This wider implication of the New Deal
references, of course, might easily be present in other reference cases
which may arise in future.
There were some who regarded the government's initiative with
suspicion. Hon. H. H. Stevens queried whether the form in which the
reference questions were couched ('Is this Act ultra vires of the
Parliament of Canada?') did not contain a subtle suggestion that the
legislation was invalid, or that the courts should search for "reasons
why the Acts are ultra vires."21
In response to Stevens' question, Ernest Lapointe replied dis-
armingly, and perhaps a trifle disingenuously, that "The very concise
form of the question means that all aspects which will have a bearing
upon the matter shall be properly included in the argument and
brought to the attention of the Court. ' 22 He also pointed out that the
federal government had retained as counsel N. W. Rowell, K.C., and
Louis S. St. Laurent, K.C., and that he had no doubt ".... that their
appointment will satisfy Canadian public opinion and is a guarantee
that the best argument possible will be presented to the Court."23 Mr.
Lapointe's reply does indicate some concern in government quarters
that the 'Canadian public' might entertain some suspicion of the
executive's motives in sending the eight New Deal statutes for judi-
cial review.
Whatever isolated segments of the public might think, however,
the initiation of the references would inspire little criticism from
either federal or provincial government spokesmen. (Federally, the
Liberals had 171 seats to 40 for the Conservatives.) In a nation-wide
election radio broadcast, eight out of nine provincial premiers (all
except Alberta's Premier Aberhart) had spoken in favour of the elec-
tion of Mackenzie King.24 It is remarkable that in an election cam-
paign in which the New Deal was an issue, only Premier L. A.
Taschereau of Quebec, among the premiers, referred to it, and he in
terms of scathing rejection.25 As the subsequent litigation revealed,
21 H. I-. Stevens to Ernest Lapointe, 6 November, 1935, Lapointe Papers,
(P.A.C.).
22 Ernest Lapointe to H. H. Stevens, 14 November, 1935, Lapointe Papers,
(P.A.C.).
23 Id.
24 The Toronto Daily Star, Wednesday, October 9, 1935, at 6-7. The full
text of each premier's speech appears in this edition of the Star.25 Cf. Premier Taschereau's allusion to Bennett's earlier Conservatism:
. he tore these leaves from the book of his political life and, unfaithful to
his past, launched into a socialistic venture, bordering on Communism, that
will lead nowhere unless to the downfall of our country." Id. at 6.
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many of the provinces considered that the sustainment of the New
Deal, at least in the important 'treaty' cases, would result in an
undesirable accretion of federal jurisdiction at the expense of the
provinces. On balance then, the provinces were apt to be more hostile
than not if the government sought to have the legislation implemented.
In the conflict between social need and constitutional jurisdiction, the
provinces were unwilling to sacrifice their prerogatives for what many
of them considered to be the dubious benefits of the New Deal.
Once the Supreme Court was vested with jurisdiction to pro-
nounce upon the validity of the New Deal, the judiciary could not
fail to be impressed by two facts: (1) the initiation of references
on the New Deal as Stevens had suggested, intimated that the govern-
ment had qualms about implementing the programme and had cause
to suspect its validity. Since the New Deal was an issue in a bitterly
fought election campaign and constituted a controversial part of the
defeated government's platform, the inference would be not unnatural
that the government was seeking a legal pretext not to implement it;
(2) The virtual unanimity of provincial counsel against the New Deal,
together with the fact that it was the federal authorities who had
sought a reference, would suggest that there was a consensus through-
out Canada, both federal and provincial, against implementing the
New Deal. The government could readily anticipate that the legislation
would be attacked by most provinces and supported, as far as could
be foreseen, by none.
The Nature of Canadian Reference Cases: The uniqueness in Anglo-
American jurisprudence of the reference procedure existing in Cana-
dian law by virtue of a section in the Sur reme Court Act,26 should
be mentioned since it had an important bearing on the result of the
New Deal cases. First, however, it is important to understand the
purpose of the reference as it was conceived in the early years of its
use. In parliamentary debates in 1891, Edward Blake, a former Liberal
Minister of Justice, and Sir John Thompson, Conservative Minister
of Justice and later Prime Minister, both stressed that references
could have an important function in determining the validity of a
provincial statute prior to the use of the power of disallowance by
the federal authorities to nullify the statute.27 They both conceived
the reference as an instrument of federal control of the provinces,
relieving the central executive of the politically sensitive task of
itself pronouncing upon the validity of provincial statutes, often
enacted by hostile provincial governments, before nullifying them.
The courts, because of their supposed impartiality, could discharge
such a task with greater objectivity. The result of the reference itself,
of course, being purely advisory in nature, left the impugned statute
in operation, leaving its disallowance up to the executive.
26 S. 55, Supreme Court Act, R.S.C., 1927.
27 See the discussion of Blake's and Thompson's attitudes in Rubin, The
Nature, Use and Effect of Reference Cases in Canadian Constitutional Law,
In W. R. LEDERmAN, ed., THm COURTS AND THE CANADiAN CoNsTrruoN, (Toron-
to, 1964) 223-225, see also, Davison, "The Constitutionality and Utility of
Advisory Opinions," (1937-38) 2 U. TOR. L.J. 254.
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Despite the fact that the courts were supposedly more impartial
than the executive in determining the constitutionality of statutes,
Lord Chancellor Loreburn referred to the potential dangers of the
reference device in a 1912 case: "No one who has experience of
judicial duties can doubt that, if an Act of this kind were abused,
manifold evils might follow, including undeserved suspicion of the
course of justice and much embarrassment and anxiety to the judges
themselves. ' 28 The Lord Chancellor does not expand upon the possible
"abuse" of the reference device, but he would seem to be referring
obliquely to a decision by the executive to transmit politically sensi-
tive measures enacted, for instance, by a hostile provincial govern-
ment, or a defeated federal rival, to the courts to avoid an embarras-
sing political decision for the moment or in the hopes that the legis-
lation would be declared invalid, or possibly both. Such a procedure,
of course, would project the courts into the forefront of the political
arena, and might subject them to pressures of a kind to which they
are not normally exposed. This is particularly the case where, as
in Canada, judges are often appointed on the basis of past political
services to the appointing authority,29 and could well feel an indebted-
ness to such an authority. Of course, the past political allegiance of
judges, in so far as it might have a bearing on their decisions in
reference cases, is an intangible factor which cannot easily be weighed,
and which might vary greatly in individual cases. It would seem,
however, that the apprehensions voiced by Lord Loreburn would be
manifest in a case where a politically sensitive issue was referred to
the Court by an executive which was the appointing authority of the
majority of judges on the Court.3 0
In his above-quoted remarks, it is evident that Lord Loreburn is
speaking of a procedure which is based on a Canadian statute and
which is unfamiliar in English law. There is no procedure strictly
analogous, under English law, to the seeking of a reference in Canada.
A declaratory judgment can be obtained in England, but such a
judgment is always grounded on a concrete case and not on queries of
a hypothetical nature like Canadian references. This is perhaps the
28 Attorney-General for Ontario vs. Attorney-General for Canada, [1912)
A.C., at 582-583.
29 f. PETER H. RUSSELL, BILINGUALISM AND BICULTURALISM Ii THE SUPREME
COURT OF CANADA, (Ottawa, 1966), at 182, ". . . there are two career patterns
which are most apt to lead to the Supreme Court-politics and the federally-
appointed judiciary. Of the 49 lawyers who have served on the Court only
10 had not previously either been members of a federal or provincial legis-
lature or else members of the bench of a provincial supreme court. And even
among the ten exceptions, two, Sedgwick and Newcombe, served as Deputy
Ministers of Justice in Ottawa, which would bring them well within the
inner circle of federal legal influentials."
30 Four of the seven judges on the Supreme Court bench when the New
Deal was argued were Liberal appointees-Duff, Cannon, Rinfret and Lamont
-and the latter three, especially, had strong partisan backgrounds, having
either been Liberal standard bearers or elected members of various legisla-
tures.
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closest approximation in English law to a reference under the Supreme
Oourt Act.3 1
In the 1911 case of Muskrat v. United States32 the U.S. Supreme
Court ruled that the constitutional validity of laws enacted by Con-
gress could not be tested until they were "properly" brought before
the Court in a concrete case. The issue arose here when Congress
passed a law in 1907 purportedly authorizing Mr. Muskrat of the
Cherokee tribe to seek an advisory opinion from the Supreme Court
on the validity of federal enactments redistributing certain Cherokee
property. In his judgment, Mr. Justice Day said: "This attempt to
obtain a judicial declaration of the validity of the Act of Congress
is not presented in a "Case" or "Controversy", to which, under the
Constitution of the United States, the judicial power alone extends."33
Neither in England nor in the United States, therefore, will the
courts entertain a hypothetical question, quite apart from a concrete
case, on an issue of national or federal law. Advisory opinions may
be obtained on questions purely of state law, however, in certain
American states;34 the exact circumstances under which such local
advisory opinions might be secured would depend on the particular
state statute involved. The seeking of advisory opinions through refer-
ences has been provided for, as well, by most Canadian provincial
legislatures. 35
On the national level, it would appear that Canada is the only
state within the Anglo-American legal framework having a procedure
allowing for constitutional references. 36 The lack of historical ana-
logues in other judicial systems, on a national level, to the reference
device entails that its evaluation must be made in a rather limited
historical perspective.
It would seem though, that in a New Deal type situation the
reference device singularly lends itself to imposing upon the courts
a role approximating that of a political decision maker. Almost
inevitably, in such a situation, the courts must weigh factors of
political policy along with legal factors before rendering their deci-
sions. When confronted with the embarrassment of implementing
31 Cf. E. WADiii & G. PImmps, CoNSTr oNAL LAW, (6th edition, London,
1960) 637. "An action for a declaratory judgment or the statement of a
special case must be based on a concrete case which has arisen. The courts
will not give answers to questions propounded in the form of hypothetical
cases. Nor can the judges be asked to give advisory opinions on points of
law."
32 219 U.S. 346.
33 See Muskrat v. United States in W. MENDELSoN, THE CoNsmrmU'oN AND
THE SuPRnml. COURT (2nd ed., New York, 1965) 11.
34 The states concerned are Alabama, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Mas-
sachusetts, Maine, North Carolina, New Hampshire, Rhode Island and South
Dakota. See H. ABRAHAM, THE JuDiciAL PRocEss. (New York, 1962) 313.
35 See supra note 20.
36 In Australia, Commonwealth legislation providing for references to the
High Court was held uZtra vires in In re Judiciary and Navigation Acts (1921),
29 C.L.R. 257. Nevertheless, very liberal treatment of the declaratory judg-
ment device in public law litigation has permitted the High Court to deal
with issues quite similar to the kind of issue raised in Canadan reference
cases. See Z. CowEN, FEDERAL JURISDIcTION lr AUSTRALIA, (Oxford, 1959) 18.
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unwanted statutes, the Canadian executive has a weapon shared by
no other national executive within the common law tradition. At the
very least the executive could delay a vexing decision on what to do
with legislation for several months, or in the case of successive hear-
ings before the Supreme Court and the Judicial Committee before
1949, for much longer. To make such a suggestion is not to aver that
a reference case could not genuinely serve a needed purpose in some
situations. However, in other situations references would seem to
lend themselves particularly to political procrastination and evasive-
ness. In conclusion, it might be suggested that it is rather ironical, in
view of the fact that the reference was originally conceived as a
device for federal control of provincial legislation, that in the New
Deal cases references were used by the provinces for the invalidation
of federal legislation.
The New Deal Before the Supreme Court of Canada
While the Canadian Supreme Court bench which heard the New
Deal references cannot easily be categorized as a centralist-or provin-
cialist-leaning body, it would probably be accurate to say that it
was inclined to uphold provincial rights in constitutional disputes.
The two Quebec judges and the New Brunswick judge had strong
provincialist inclinations, while the other judges were not markedly
eager to frame their judgments in such terms that they would be
able to circumvent precedent, which in 1936 was a bulwark of the
provincial power. Whether by force or legal precedent or natural
inclination, the Court was considerably biased towards the provinces
in any constitutional confrontation. An examination of the back-
grounds of the judges assists in explaining the division of the court,
especially in the Natural Products Marketing Act reference, the
Labour Conventions reference and the unemployment insurance refer-
ence.
Probably the most arresting facts about the six-man panel which
heard the references (Mr. Justice Lamont being absent through ill-
ness), were the political backgrounds of the judges and, with the
exception of Chief Justice Sir Lyman Duff, their specialization in
fields other than constitutional law.
Duff himself was a jurist of distinction and is generally held to
have been the strongest legal authority on the 1936 Supreme Court
bench. A master of trenchant and incisive English, he wrote his
opinions in a style which bears comparison with Holmes or Birken-
head. His very knowledge of the law, however, may have induced him
to take a stereotyped view of cases which prima facie seemed to fall
within the categories of Judicial Committee precedent. If the great
jurist was not merely a man of legal erudition, but one who weighed
factors of both law and policy before rendering a decision, it may be
said that sometimes Duff did not sufficiently consider policy factors-
legal scholar that he was, he tended to over-emphasize the importance
of precedent. In certain instances his frame of reference was too
narrow.
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Born at Meaford, Ontario in 1865, Duff majored in mathematics
and metaphysics at the University of Toronto, taking his arts degree
in 1887 and his law degree in 1889. After teaching briefly at a
secondary school in Barrie, he was called to the Ontario bar in 1893,
but following two years of practice in Ontario decided to practice law
in British Columbia. His rise in the legal profession there was rapid,
and in 1903 he presented the federal brief before the Alaska Boundary
Commission along with Edward Blake. In 1906 he was made a puisne
judge of the Supreme Court of Canada, after having served for two
years on the provincial Supreme Court.37
Duff was regarded as an authority on constitutional and criminal
law. His meticulously phrased judgments were models of judicial
literature, and a former lord chancellor said that his sole equals on
North American courts were Brandeis and Holmes. In his own
opinion, his greatest judgment was the one advising the government
that appeals to the Judicial Committee could be abolished.3 8
Although Duff was never involved as actively in political affairs
as some of his colleagues, he was, before his elevation, a strong sup-
porter of the Liberal Party. A former president of the Victoria Liberal
Club, he was asked on one occasion to serve in Laurier's cabinet, but
declined. Although Sir Lyman was assuredly not a Conservative,
Borden proposed in 1917 that he lead the Union Government being
formed of pro-conscriptionist forces from both major parties. The
possibility of Duff's serving as prime minister arose when some of
the Unionist Liberals proved lukewarm to Borden's continued tenure
of office at the head of a "national" government. Borden was able
finally to secure the consent of the dissidents to his leadership before
a formal offer was made to Mr. Justice Duff.39
In 1919, while still a puisne judge on the Supreme Court of
Canada, he was appointed to -the Imperial Privy Council and heard
manv judicial appeals in London. In the 1920s he served as an arbi-
trator in a boundary dispute between Ulster and the Irish Free State.
A man of diverse experience and broad interests, he dabbled in higher
mathematics, including relativity theory, and conducted a corres-
pondence in Greek with Lord Haldane. He was an omnivorous reader
and a lover of poetry, especially the work of the Canadian poet Duncan
Campbell Scott, and he could recite pages of Milton from memory.40
Although among Duff's judgments there were several important
ones upholding the provincial power at the expense of the federal
government, he may, like many of his brethren, have felt that Judicial
Committee precedents left him little choice but to find for the pro-
vinces when a conflict arose over constitutional jurisdiction. In the
New Deal references, he adopted a moderate position, supporting the
validity of the I.L.O. and unemployment insurance statutes, but
holding that the Natural Products Marketing Act was ultra vires. It
37 The Ottawa Citizen, Friday, March 18, 1933, 1.
38 The Montreal Gazette, Thursday, April 28, 1955, at 6. The decision
referred to was Reference re Privy Council Appeals, [1940] 1 D.L.R. 289.
39 The Ottawa Citizen, Tuesday, April 26, 1955, 1.
40 The Montreal Gazette, Thursday, April 28, 1955 at 6.
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is apparent from his conversation with acquaintances that he sought
to gain a consensus on the bench for those parts of the New Deal,
including the treaty legislation, which did not seem to him to run
absolutely against the current of precedent. His observation to Finlay-
son that he was "having the devil's own time with my brother
Crocket" during the New Deal litigation shows his proclivity towards
judicial leadership. It was apparent to Duff that opposition to the
treaty statutes by the two Quebec judges, Cannon and Rinfret, would
produce a 3-3 tie (with Mr. Justice Lamont absent), unless Crocket
could be won over to side with Kerwin, Davis and himself. His efforts
to convince the intransigent Crocket proved fruitless, however, with
the result that the court remained deadlocked. Although technically
this meant that the statutes were upheld, it was bound to present an
appearance of sharp division on the Canadian bench and enhance the
provincial position when an appeal was taken to the Judicial Com-
mittee.
The New Brunswick appointee on the Court, with whom Duff
took such fruitless pains, Mr. Justice 0. S. Crocket, had been a judge
of the provincial Supreme Court for 19 years when he was called to
Ottawa in September, 1932. There was considerable vacillation by
the government in choosing a successor to Mr. Justice E. L. New-
combe of Nova Scotia who had died the preceding fall, and much
bitterness on Crocket's part that he was not selected earlier by Ben-
nett. "Two weeks ago," he wrote Senator Meighen, "The Gleaner
published a news article stating the P.M. had written Baxter strongly
urging him to accept as a matter of public duty and that if he did not
he would have to seek elsewhere for a competent man. As I regarded
this a most pointed reflection on my character and sagacity as a
judge I wrote the P.M. a letter of which I enclose you a copy. The
affair had given rise to all sorts of talk."41 Crocket's chagrin apparently
arose from the fact that he and most of the provincial press considered
that he would be appointed to the vacancy. Crocket wrote a further
letter to Meighen, who was government leader in the Senate, asking
for an "unpublicized" meeting in Montreal at the Windsor Hotel,
where he evidently intended to press his candidacy further, but
Meighen replied that the pressure of business made the meeting im-
possible.42 Six months were to elapse before Crocket's appointment
and he underwent much embarrassment over Bennett's hesitancy in
appointing him to the Court.
Born at Chatham, New Brunswick, in 1868, Crocket graduated
from the University of New Brunswick with an arts degree when
only eighteen years of age. After his call to the bar, he was elected
as a Conservative to the House of Commons in 1904 for the constitu-
ency of York. He was re-elected in 1908 and 1911, receiving a record
majority in the latter year. On his appointment to the New Brunswick
41 Crocket to Meighen, 10 February, 1932, Meighen Papers, (P.A.C.).
42 Crocket to Meighen, 7 March, 1932, and Meighen to Crocket, 9 March,
1932, Id.
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Supreme Court in December, 1913, he resigned his seat.43 His work
as a judge in New Brunswick was concerned mainly with divorce
proceedings, his appointment to the federal judiciary being recorded
by the Montreal Gazette on an inside page under a heading which
read partly "Now Divorce Judge."4 4 Lacking Duff's more extensive
judicial background and breadth of mind, Crocket tended to resent
the pre-eminence of the former (who was to be elevated to the chief
justiceship in the following year). His personal antipathy to Duff
may have been one factor in hardening him against those portions
of the New Deal programme which Duff supported, but this is difficult
to assess objectively, and certainly other factors were present in
Crocket's rejection of the reform programme. In addition to the
mortification arising out of the tardiness of his appointment, Crocket
represented an older school of Conservative politicians who found
Bennett's New Deal ideologically distasteful. During the course of his
efforts to persuade Crocket to support the I.L.O. Legislation, as Duff
later told acquaintances, the New Brunswick jurist had charged that
Bennett had "ruined" the Conservative Party with his New Deal
speeches of January, 1935. 45
A man of uncompromising morality himself, he tended to be
inflexible once his opinions were formed. An obituary records that
he declared a tire replaced on his car to Canadian customs, along
with the most trivial purchases, when crossing the border. A staunch
Presbyterian, he took a leading role in the opposition to amalgamation
before the formation of the United Church of Canada. There was
in both his religious and political views a traditionalism which extolled
self-reliance and industry, and conversely deprecated "socialistic"
experiments like the New Deal which, he would consider, cramped
individual initiative by fostering state paternalism.
Along with Crocket, Mr. Justice Thibaudeau Rinfret and Mr.
Justice L. A. Cannon furnished a hard core of resistance to the New
Deal during the references.
Thibaudeau Rinfret, who was to succeed Duff as Chief Justice
in 1944, was an authority on corporation and municipal law during
his practice, serving concurrently as a professor of the law of public
utilities and comparative law at McGill for a ten-year period. After
his elevation to the Court in 1924, he was on terms of intimacy with
Duff, frequently holding whispered consultations with the latter when
court was in session. Before his appointment to the Supreme Court of
Canada he spent two years as a judge on the Quebec Superior Court.
In 1908 he contested the Quebec riding of Terrebonne for the Liberals,
but was defeated. His brother Fernand Rinfret was twice Secretary
of State in Mackenzie King's cabinet and a former Mayor of Mont-
real.46 Like Duff, only much later in his career, he was appointed to
43 The Telegraph-Journal, Saint John, Wednesday, September 21, 1932,
at 1.
44 The Montreal Gazette, Wednesday, September 21, 1932, at 11.
45 Interview with R. K. Finlayson, March 23, 1966.
46 The Montreal Gazette, Saturday, November 8, 1944, at 1.
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the Imperial Privy Council, but was able to serve on the Judicial
Committee for only two years before the abolition of Canadian
Appeals. Rinfret was among those prominently mentioned for the
office of Governor-General in 1952. A Catholic, he received the Grand
Cross of the Order of St. Gregory the Great from the Pope in 1948,
marking the first time the award was made to a Canadian.47 Rinfret
was originally named to the 1936 Royal Commission established by
King to review the financial basis of Confederation but when he
became ill Joseph Sirois was appointed in his place, to serve on what
was subsequently called the Rowell-Sirois Commission.
Rinfret's Quebec colleague, Mr. Justice L. A. Cannon, was
appointed to the Court in 1930 to fill a vacancy caused by the retire-
ment of Mr. Justice P. B. Mignault. Like Rinfret, he too had a
brother in the King cabinet, Lucien Cannon, Mr. King's solicitor
general. The son of a judge of the Quebec Superior Court, Cannon's
family was of Irish descent but had long been regarded as French.
Cannon had served as a Quebec City alderman for eight years before
his election in 1916 as a Liberal member of the Quebec Legislature
for Quebec Centre. One of the most important incidents of his busy
practice was a two-year period when he was counsel for the Province
of Quebec and the Quebec Harbours Board when the Railway Com-
mission of Canada was investigating the structure of freight rates
from 1925-1927. Before his Supreme Court appointment, Cannon
served for three years on the Quebec Superior Court; he was married
to a daughter of former Canadian Chief Justice Sir Charles Fitz-
patrick.48
The three above-mentioned judges furnished what may be called
the core of opposition to the New Deal on the tribunal which heard
the cases. These three judges adamantly opposed the treaty legisla-
tion and unemployment insurance, while Duff, Kerwin and Davis held
that the former statutes could be sustained and Duff and Davis held
that the latter enactment was valid. They also joined with a unani-
mous bench in declaring unconstitutional the Natural Products
Marketing Act while Crocket and Cannon delivered dissenting opi-
nions in two other references where the statutes involved were upheld
by the rest of the Court.49
Another future Chief Justice who sat on the bench considering
Bennett's social legislation, Patrick Kerwin, was an unpretentious
jurist who talked in short, simple sentences. After his call to the bar
at the age of 22, Kerwin practiced law in Sarnia until his promotion
to the Supreme Court of Ontario in 1932. In 1935 Kerwin was Prime
Minister Bennett's last appointment to the Supreme Court of
Canada. Although he was a Conservative, he was not involved as
47 The Ottawa Journal, Thursday, July 26, 1962, at 1.
48 The Montreal Daily Star, Wednesday, January 15, 1930, at 8.
49 See the dissent by Cannon J., in the Farmers' Creditors Arrangement
Act reference at [1936] S.C.R. 394, and the dissents of Cannon and Crocket,
JJ., in the reference re Section 498A of the Criminal Code at 368 and 371
respectively.
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actively in partisan politics prior to his elevation to the bench as
were some of his colleagues.5 0
Appointed to the Court five months before Kerwin, Mr. Justice
H. H. Davis was a native of Brockville, Ontario, who sat for two
years on the Ontario Court of Appeal before his appointment. Davis
was involved in important investigations both before and after his
elevation, inquiring into a Vancouver longshoremen's strike and into
alleged irregularities in the manufacture of Bren guns for the federal
government by John Inglis, Ltd., in 1938. Mr. Justice Davis had
high standing in the legal profession, having served as president of
the Canadian Bar Association in the same year he was appointed to
the federal bench,5 1 but nothing in his legal career discloses any close
association with constitutional law.
Counsels' Argument Before the Supreme Court
Arguing for the federal government in the 1936 references were
three counsel, not all of whom were uniformly able as constitutional
lawyers. Unquestionably the ablest of the three, and soon to be
appointed Chief Justice of Ontario, was Newton W. Rowell, K.C.
Rowell had served as Acting Secretary of State for External Affairs
in Borden's Union Government, and was present at the 1919 I.L.O.
Convention in Washington where the groundwork was laid for some
of the labour conventions involved in the New Deal litigation. Louis
S. St. Laurent, K.C., was an able and experienced corporation counsel,
but not the equal of Rowell as a constitutional lawyer. C. P. Plaxton,
K.C., was the representative of the Department of Justice in both
Ottawa and London.
Rowell expressed keen disappointment that he could not argue
the ultimate New Deal cases before the Privy Council because of his
promotion to the bench. Bennett and his associates, who greatly ad-
mired Rowell, considered that the ultimate appeals were mismanaged
by St. Laurent and R. S. Robertson, K.C., who succeeded Rowell, and
regretted the latter's inability to represent the federal government in
London. This resulted in what they felt was a relatively weak case
being presented before the Judicial Committee.
While the factums prepared by the various provinces may not
have had a traumatic effect on the bench, the provincial unanimity
against the enactment of the social legislation under the treaty clause
could hardly fail to impress the judges with what amounted to a
provincial abhorrence to the validation of the New Deal under section
132.
The focus of provincial opposition to the New Deal was undoubt-
edly the treaty legislation. If the I.L.O. legislation were upheld, similar
federal enactments might in future oust any supposed area of provin-
cial jurisdiction. Provincial attitudes on other parts of the reform
programme varied, but there was provincial unanimity concerning
50 The Ottawa Journal, Monday, February 4, 1963, at 1.
51 The Montreal Gazette, Saturday, July 1, 1944, at 1.
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the constitutional repugnancy and political undesirability of the
treaty statutes. The factums submitted to the Supreme Court late
in 1935 and early in 1936 bear out a report in the Regina Leader Post52
that only Quebec and New Brunswick were intending to attack the
validity of all of the New Deal statutes; the report stated that of the
seven provinces submitting factums (all provinces except Nova Scotia
and Prince Edward Island), Manitoba, Saskatchewan and Alberta
would attack only the treaty legislation. 3 It was further stated that
on each of the other statutes the prairie provinces would express
no opinion, neither defending nor attacking their validity, but ex
abundanti cautela, reserving the right to appeal any decision rendered.
If the mildest and most qualified opposition to the New Deal
statutes came from the prairies, the sharpest opposition to the social
legislation came from Quebec and New Brunswick. New Brunswick,
with the knowledge that Quebec would strenuously oppose the whole
New Deal, did not have a separate legal argument drafted but adopted
the grounds of objection and legal argument of the Quebec factum
in toto.54
The factum of Quebec charged that the entire I.L.O. legislation
was ultra vires the federal power since it concerned matters lying
within provincial jurisdiction, specifically matters dealing with "civil
rights" and "local and private" conditions.55 Moreover, Mr. Justice
Duff had, according to Quebec, disposed of any uncertainty sur-
rounding the issue in his Hours of Work decision in 1925,56 when he
said that the subject matter of the relevant convention was within
provincial jurisdiction except for federal employees and territories
administered by the federal government. 57 In addition, the Dominion
authorities had already brought the disputed conventions to the
attention of the Quebec government and had no further duty to dis-
charge under the Treaty of Versailles.58 The only new act, according
to the Province, was the federal ratification of the conventions, and
the act of ratification did not itself remove the subject-matter of the
agreements from provincial jurisdiction.59 The position of Quebec
52 The Regina Leader Post, Saturday, January 18, 1936, at 19.
53 This report was borne out by the three short factums presented by the
prairie provinces. See Factum of Manitoba, dated 6 January, 1936; Factum
of Saskatchewan dated 6 January, 1936, and Factum of Alberta dated 30
December, 1935, (I.L.O. file, Supreme Court Library, Ottawa).
54 Factum of New Brunswick, undated, signed by Donald V. White of the
Attorney General's Department, (I.L.O. file, Supreme Court Library, Ottawa).
55 Factum of Quebec, undated, signed by Charles Lanctot and Aims
Geoffrion, 11, Id.
56 See supra note 11.
57 Factum of Quebec, 19.
58 Article 405 of the Treaty of Versailles had acknowledged the difficul-
ties that might arise in implementing labour conventions in federal states
because of the division of legislative jurisdicton, and had made special
provision therefor: "In the case of a federal state, the power of which to
enter into conventions on labour matters is subject to limitations, it shall
be in the discretion of that Government to treat a draft convention to which
such limitations apply as a recommendation only ....
59 Factum of Quebec, at 20.
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was that ratification did not alter constitutional responsibilities.
Quebec was, apparently, arguing either that ratification without prior
provincial consent was ineffective, or that ratification imposed an
international duty on Canada which it could not discharge by itself
under the Constitution because the federal authorities could not
appropriate provincial subject matter, clandestinely as it were, merely
by ratifying international agreements. The political implications of
the argument in the Quebec factum were not (however,) elaborated in
detail.
The Ontario factum was considerably more convoluted. Ontario
contended that in so far as the I.L.O. legislation rested on section
13260 it was invalid, but contended at the same time that the legisla-
tion could be upheld under the peace, order and good government
clause of section 91.61 The provincial position, in brief, was that while
it was not possible to sanction the labour legislation under the treaty-
implementing power, it could probably be upheld under the residuary
clause.
Senator Roebuck, who was provincial counsel during the refer-
ences, later explained the provincial position at greater length.62 The
Ontario Government, according to him, was trying to reconcile provin-
cial rights with a not unprogressive social philosophy: It was the
only province to make an explicit attempt to do this before the courts.
Attorney-General Roebuck, along with I. A. Humphries, K.C., of his
Department, adopted a legal stance which they considered would not
oppose the legislation unless it were impossible to uphold it without
sacrificing the Province's constitutional powers to the central govern-
ment. They considered that the validation of the statutes under section
132 would amount to such a sacrifice, since there was, they held, no
authority whatsoever under that section which would authorize Par-
liament to enact the legislation, but, and they argued the point in
considerable detail, the legislation could be upheld under section 91.
In support of this contention, they submitted that the type of social
legislation envisaged by the I.L.O. statutes reached out widely into
the economic life of the nation and affected "the standard of life
60 Section 132 reads as follows: "The Parliament and Government of
Canada shall have all powers necessary or proper for performing the Obliga-
tions of Canada or of any Province thereof, as Part of the British Empire,
towards Foreign Countries, arising under Treaties between the Empire and
such Foreign Countries."
61 Factum of Ontario, dated December, 1935.
62 Interview with Senator Roebuck, January 7, 1966. It is noteworthy that
among provincial counsel arguing the New Deal cases there were several,
including Mr. Roebuck, Attorney-General J. B. McNair of New Brunswick and
J. W. deB. Farris of British Columbia who held exceptionally strong views on
provincial rights. Attorney-General Roebuck, for example, considered that
within the ambit of its legislative jurisdiction, Ontario had many of the attri-
butes of a sovereign state. Accordingly, the provincial legislature of Ontario
could ratify an agreement involving property and civil rights which had been
concluded by the Province with France or Japan. The fact that the right was
not exercised did not mean that it did not exist. Once ratified, the formal per-
fection of the treaty required only the signature of the lieutenant-governor,




of the Canadian people as a whole." 63 Economic conditions were handi-
capped throughout Canada by having different local rates for mini-
mum wages and different maximum hours of labour, for example,
and these were precisely the handicaps which the disputed legislation
was designed to overcome. Moreover, if various provincial schemes
were adopted, instead of a single national scheme, it could disturb
the equilibrium of industrial relations in the various provinces. It
would, for instance, lead to competition among industrialists to situ-
ate factories where labour could be obtained at the cheapest cost and
could be made to work for the longest hours. Obviously, to combat
such undesirable competition nation-wide legislation, which only the
Dominion could enact, was essential. "If it is of national concern,"
this part of the factum concluded, "then there should be uniformity
of law in hours of toil and cessation from toil, and minimum wages
so that there will be equality as between the Provinces."6 4 The con-
clusion was inescapable: since only the Dominion could legislate com-
prehensively to regulate labour conditions from one end of the
country to the other, and since regulation was necessary in the light
of present conditions, the federal government could enact the labour
legislation under section 91, but not under section 132, which did
not apply. Section 132 did not apply, because the Treaty of Peace
contained mere precatory words-or terms of "pious hope"-and did
not impose a binding duty on Canada to enact the legislation.65 It was
only prior international obligation which created federal jurisdiction,
and since no obligation could be demonstrated it was not possible
to ground jurisdiction on section 132.
The British Columbia factum was adamantly opposed to the
treaty legislation, not on the merits of the treaty legislation, but
because of the alleged attempt of the Dominion to invade provincial
jurisdiction. 66 Counsel for British Columbia, in fact, contended that
social legislation had been enacted in the Province "far in advance
of many of these draft conventions." 67
The factum rigorously set out the procedure according to which
the Dominion was to secure the consent of the provinces when a draft
convention involved provincial subject matter. In such a case, the
Dominion had merely to bring the convention to the attention of the
appropriate provincial authorities. If in this case, the province took
no action, the matter was ended. If, on the other hand, the provinces
gave consent and formal ratification of the convention by the Domin-
ion followed, the Dominion could enact legislation, but only if the
provinces had failed to do so after a reasonable time. In the present
case, however, the essential preliminary consent of the provinces had
not been obtained.68
63 Factum of Ontario, 15.
64 Id.
65 Id. at 3.
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In the face of this provincial unanimity that the I.L.O. statutes
could not be upheld under the treaty power, the factum of the
Attorney-General of Canada maintaining the contrary was bound
to present an appearance of isolation. Although the factum relied
on three grounds to uphold the statutes, principal reliance was placed
on the capacity of Parliament to implement them under section
132, once they had been duly ratified. The other grounds urged for
sustaining the statutes were the residuary clause, as suggested in
the Ontario factum, and the trade and commerce power.
The Dominion factum recited that under the British Constitution
the prerogative of treaty-making resided solely with the Crown. The
Sovereign had absolute discretion, in theory, on the making of
treaties. The prerogative of the Sovereign had, however, through
constitutional usage become the privilege of his ministry in Great
Britain, and of the respective ministries in the various British self-
governing states. The famous declaration of equality made at the
Imperial Conference of 192669 implied a co-ordinate distribution of
executive as well as legislative power. Accordingly, the responsible
Canadian ministry could advise the Sovereign concerning the con-
clusion of treaties equally with the British ministry at Westminster.
There was no derogation of treaty-making capacity consequent on the
transfer of full sovereignty from Westminster to Ottawa.7 0
Once ratified, the conventions became binding on Canada as a
whole and even if they were not considered "treaties" under section
132, they were still internationally binding agreements which the
Dominion could implement legislatively under the residuary power
in section 91. There followed a brief invocation of the residuary
power,7 1 the force of which was insignificant when contrasted with
the pages of detailed argument devoted to the validation of the
statutes under section 132.
The brevity with which the federal factum dealt with the alter-
native grounds involving the residuary and trade and commerce
clauses left no doubt that the federal case rested substantially on
sustaining the statutes under the treaty power. The later disposition
of the case suggests that the alternative arguments did little to rein-
force the strength of the federal position. In this and other New
Deal cases, court procedure had a significant influence in crystallizing
the issues and selecting certain points from those presented by
counsel for special consideration. In a recent study for the Royal
Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, Professor Peter H.
Russell has sharply contrasted the effect of oral and written argu-
ment by counsel in several countries with common law traditions.
Insistence on systematic written pleadings and extensive oral argu-
ment in the Supreme Court of Canada has resulted in a situation
69 Self-governing Dominions were defined at the Conference as " ...
autonomous communities within the British Empire, equal in status and in no
way subordinate one to another in any aspect of their domestic or external
affairs ... ." IMPERIAL ConRENCE, 1926, SUmMARY oF PROCEEDINGS, 9.
70 Factum of Canada, 15-17.
71 Id. at 22.
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where the judges in that forum rely mainly on opposing counsel to
define the main issues.72 The situation is quite different in the United
States Supreme Court where counsel are normally permitted only
one hour for oral argument.73 American judges, moreover, are quick
to direct counsel to discard arguments which appear to be of only
secondary importance, and to concentrate on the real issues, as
perceived by the bench rather than by counsel. More exhaustive
research into the definition of the issues and the merits of the case,
in the interests of the development of a significant corpus of public
law rather than merely satisfying the claims of private litigants, is
made possible in the United States through the assistance of able
law clerks, who play no part in the work of Canadian tribunals.
In the Labour Conventions case the Canadian bench substanti-
ally accepted the issue as defined in the factums. And federal counsel
had opted, in effect, to have the validity of the statutes depend pri-
marily on the treaty power. It may be suggested that this was a
major tactical error. Had federal counsel relied primarily on sup-
porting the legislation under the residuary clause, they would have
achieved two important benefits. First, they would have blunted
some of the strong provincial opposition to the validation of the
legislation, which, as has been mentioned, was attributable not so
much to the substantive provisions of the legislation as to the appre-
hension that a federal treaty power sustained under such circum-
stances might be used indiscriminately in future to appropriate other
supposed provincial subject matter. (The sole objection to the legis-
lation by the prairie provinces, it should be remembered, as far as
can be seen from their factums, was that the Dominion was seeking
to uphold it under the treaty power.7 4 ) Second, they could have
achieved a closer alliance with Ontario-the largest industrial
province-which had urged that the legislation could be sustained
under the residuary power. This tactic could well have relieved the
courts of the impression of provincial solidarity against the New Deal.
Reliance on the residuary power by the Dominion in the Labour
Conventions and unemployment insurance cases, in fact, could have
resulted in a confrontation between Canada and Ontario on the one
hand and Quebec, New Brunswick and British Columbia, on the
other, or three jurisdictions against two, rather than seven against
one. In such a case, needless to say, the judges would not have had
such a strong impression of intransigent provincial opposition to the
legislation.
The Supreme Court's Judgment in the I.L.O. Case
As might have been deduced from the emphasis in the respective
factums, the judgments in the I.L.O. case turned mainly on the
72 RUSSELL, supra note 29, at 211.
73 Id. at 210, and cf. Id. at 224, ".. . It might be appropriate for the Court
to develop procedures which concentrate more of its energies on carefully re-
searching the problems which come before it and less on umpiring the points
raised by lawyers .......
74 Vide supra.
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validity of the legislation as implementing Canadian treaty obliga-
tions. The Court was evenly divided with Duff, Kerwin and Davis
upholding the statutes and Rinfret, Cannon and Crocket strongly
contending that the I.L.O. legislation was ultra vires.
Speaking for what might be termed (at least in this case) the
centralist members of the Court, Duff expressed the view that on
Canada's recent accession to sovereignty the Canadian executive
had acquired full treaty-making powers, as plenary in every respect
as the corresponding powers held by the British executive. Whilst it
was true that the evolution to full nationhood was accomplished
through convention rather than strict law, Duff held that the usage
by which Great Britain and the Dominions entered into various
international agreements ".... must be recognized by the courts as
having the force of law."75 Accordingly, there was no impediment in-
capacitating the federal government from entering into international
treaties or less formal agreements.
Turning to Article 405 of the Treaty of Versailles, Duff contended
that a reading of paragraphs 5 and 7 together showed that the
"competence" postulated to give effect to labour conventions was
the competence to enact legislation in furtherance of a treaty obliga-
tion and, under the circumstances, the treaty obligation was one
falling under section 132. Only the federal government could legislate
to implement such an obligation. Duff based this conclusion on two
considerations: (1) Section 132 of the B.N.A. Act confided full legi-
slative and executive powers for giving effect to any treaty to the
federal government; the provinces had no power to legislate for such
a purpose, the Privy Council itself having held that the federal power
was exclusive in the Radio and Aeronautics cases; (2) the evolution
of Canada to full sovereignty in the last twenty years had conferred
upon her the capacity to enter into and to incur obligations through all
kinds of international agreements. 76
Duff discussed, at considerable length, a 1923 case decided by the
Judicial Committee 77 in order to rebut a statement by provincial
counsel that matters ordinarily falling within section 92 of the B.N.A.
Act were excluded from the ambit of Dominion authority under
section 132. In this case the British Columbia Legislature purported
to validate by statute certain orders-in-council barring Chinese and
Japanese from employment under provincial contracts, leases and
concessions. Such intra-provincial agreements would ordinarily fall
under the provincial head of property and civil rights. Notwithstand-
ing normal provincial jurisdiction, the Judicial Committee held that
the B.C. statute was invalid for violating the principle laid down in
a prior federal statute, the Japanese Treaty Act, 1913, the enactment
of which was authorized under section 132.78 The corollary was clear,
75 [1936J S.C.R. 477.
76 Id. at 495496.
77 Attorney-General of British Columbia v. Attorney-General of Canada,[1924] A.C. 203.
78 [1936] S.C.R. 482-483.
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if provincial agreements ordinarily falling under section 92 could be
overridden by the treaty-making power, or by federal legislation
enacted thereunder, it was not of much significance whether the
matters covered by the I.L.O. conventions, and the federal statutes
enacted to implement them, "ordinarily" fell under provincial juris-
diction.
The judgments given by the Quebec and New Brunswick judges
holding that the statutes were ultra vires agreed that the legislation
encroached in a radical fashion on property and civil rights in the
provinces 7 9 The three judgments asserted that essential formalities
of international law were lacking in the manner in which the federal
government had secured ratification and this made the supposed
treaty obligations, in effect a nullity. Mr. Justice Rinfret and Mr.
Justice Cannon both asserted, the former explicitly and the latter
implicitly, that an international agreement dealing with provincial
subject matter could not validly be ratified by the federal power with-
out the prior authorization of the provinces.8 0 If this doctrine were
accepted without qualification, then any state entering into inter-
national agreements with Canada would have to ascertain whether
or not domestic constitutional requirements had been satisfied before
it could rely on the binding force of an undertaking by the Dominion.
The point raised by Rinfret and Cannon in this regard was of great
importance. The federal government in its factum and the provinces
in theirs had both dwelt lengthily on the question of whether a valid
international obligation existed which Ottawa might implement under
section 132. The Quebec judges were, accordingly, confronting the
central issue raised by the factums when they dealt with the validity
of the purported international obligation under the ratified I.L.O.
conventions. If they were correct in their legal analysis, the principal
thrust of the whole federal case collapsed.
If the premises of the Quebec judges be granted, it must be con-
ceded that they could find some support for their position among
eminent publicists. Dr. Charles G. Fenwick, for example, has this
to say about the general issue they raise:
The majority of writers ... maintain that foreign governments should
be held to a knowledge of the constitutional prerequisites of ratificationin each country with which they are dealing; and they insist that a treaty
which has been ratified without the proper observance of these require-
ments is ipso facto invalid, whatever the proclamation of the head of
state may assert in that respect.8'
79 Cf. [1936J S.C.R. Rinfret at 511-512; Cannon at 520 and Crocket at 522.
80 Of. Rinfret at [1936] S.C.R. 513: MIt follows from all that I have said
that, in my opinion, the draft conventions on which is based the legislation
now submitted to us have not been properly and competently ratified, that
they could not be ratified without the consent of the legislatures in each
province... " And cf. Cannon Id. at 522: "Before accepting as binding any
agreement under section 405 of the Treaty of Versailles, foreign powers must
take notice that this country's constitution is a federal, not a legislative
union."1
81 FnNwIcK, INTERxATIONAL LAW, (3rd ed., New York, 1949) 435-436. Fen-
wick cities five authorities to the effect that a treaty ratified unconstitutionally
is valid and eight to the opposite effect, see Id. footnotes 47 and 48 at 436.
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And Professor Lauterpacht, in his latest edition of Oppenheim's
International Law82 affirms that because of their constitutions, federal
states may often be unable to enter into international agreements,
or unable to perform international agreements which they have pur-
portedly assumed. Lauterpacht of course, is dealing with the situation
after the New Deal, but his observations on subsequent developments
tend to confirm Rinfret's and Cannon's viewpoint that the implement-
ation of international agreements in federal states can be made com-
plex because of peculiar constitutional requirements.
Mr. Justice Crocket based the invalidity of the legislation on the
fact that Canada had not observed the eighteen month time-limit
established by the I.L.O. for the submission of draft conventions to
the ratifying authority, and he held, therefore, that the purported
ratification of the three labour conventions in 1935-long after the
time-limit had expired-was irregular and not binding.83 Crocket's
view is certainly tenable, although a case for the contrary view can
also be made. Crocket was resorting to a rather narrow, technical
interpretation concerning a draft agreement contrived to confer an
important international benefit, and one might argue that in such a
case the relevant language in Article 405 would be construed as
directory rather than mandatory.8 4 This was especially the case when
the international body entitled to rely on the supposed mandatory
language impliedly waived such a right by registering the Canadian
ratifications in Geneva.
The issue in the Labour Conventions case as conjointly defined
by federal and provincial factums made the federal case particularly
difficult to sustain. Largely because of the emphases in the factums,
a decision was facilitated on vulnerable side-issues and the judiciary
never came to grips with the real problem-who has jurisdiction to
enact wide-ranging social legislation, especially in a period of econo-
mic depression. The mechanics of treaty-making, in this context, was
surely a secondary issue. The factums, however, defined the principal
issue of the case as the legality of implementing the three labour
conventions under section 132 by the statutes in dispute. Provincial
unanimity against such a procedure, especially with seven of nine
provinces submitting briefs, placed federal counsel in a position of
friendless isolation. The confrontation, from the perspective of the
bench, must have seemed like a crisis of Canadian federalism. Under
these circumstances, there were bound to be judicial doubts about
82 H. LAUTERPACHT, ed., OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW, (8th ed.) 179-
180.
83 [1936] S.C.R. at 538.
84 The relevant paragraph 5 of Article 405 of the Treaty of Peace reads:
"Each of the members undertakes that it will, within the period of one year
at most from the closing session of the Conference, or if it is impossible owing
to exceptional circumstances to do so within the period of one year, then at
the earliest practicable moment and in no case later than eighteen months
from the closing of the session of the Conference bring the recommendation
or draft convention before the authority or authorities within whose compet-
ence the matter lies, for the enactment of legislation or other action."
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federal jurisdiction, about the regularity of ratification, and about
the bona fides of the federal government in proceeding thus indirectly
to implement the statutes under the treaty power. The federal choice
of ground was bad. The factums gave a misleading emphasis to the
importance of upholding the legislation under the treaty power,
where the statutes might have been upheld more directly and with
greater plausibility, as the factum of Ontario suggested, under the
peace, order and good government clause.
The Disposition of the Other Cases
Indirection, if not outright deviousness, was also a feature of
the argument of federal counsel in the unemployment insurance refer-
ence. It is not meant to suggest that counsel were deliberately.trying
to deceive the courts by the manner in which they argued, but in
both the I.L.O. and social insurance references they tended to put
their cases obliquely-not arguing that the subject matter was in
the federal domain necessarily, but that the invocation of other
powers, the treaty power or the taxing power, made the proposed
statutes a valid subject-matter for federal enactment. It may have
been felt that these manoeuvres were tactically advisable, but quite
apart from the intentions of counsel it tended to present an aspect
almost of stealth to the federal argument. It was also an irritant to
the provinces, whose spokesmen would feel that such tactics, if suc-
cessful, could be invoked repeatedly in future to abolish completely
the division of powers in the Constitution, and hence the viability of
Canada as a federal state.
Federal counsel tried to uphold Mr. Bennett's unemployment
insurance statute under three distinct heads, but principal reliance
was placed upon sustaining the enactment under the general taxing
power. The alternative grounds urged were (a) the peace, order and
good government clause; (b) the exclusive federal power to regulate
trade and commerce and (c) the power to raise money by any mode
or system of taxation and the related power to appropriate public
moneys so raised for any public purpose.8 5 In connection with the
residuary clause, counsel argued that the sheer dimensions of un-
employment during the depression made what was once a local
problem a national one.8 6 In its anticipated effects, the statute would
have a general regulatory effect on trade across the whole Dominion,
and hence the trade and commerce power was invoked.87 Last,
compulsory contributions were "taxes" within the intention of sec-
tion 91(3) of the B.N.A. Act, and were imposed by Parliament for a
public purpose.8 8
The provinces stressed in their factums that no obligation
existed under the Treaty of Versailles or other international agree-
85 Factum of the Attorney-General of Canada., passim. (Social Insurance
file, Supreme Court Library, Ottawa).
86 Id. at 8.
87 Id. at 11.
88 iTd.
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ments for the implementation of an unemployment insurance scheme
by Canada.8 9 Beyond their assertion that there was no authorization
for the enactment of the statute under the federal treaty power, the
prairie provinces made no submission as to the validity of the legis-
lation. British Columbia,90 Quebec, 91 and by inference New Bruns-
wick,92 all attacked the legislation as being unwarranted under the
residuary power, as well as under the treaty power. Counsel for
Ontario acknowledged the need for the legislation, conceded that
the Dominion was the only law-making authority which could achieve
the desired purpose on a nation-wide scale and sought the upholding
of the legislation under the residuary clause.93
Mr. Justice Patrick Kerwin joined the three judges who had
opposed the validity of the I.L.O. statutes to give a majority to those
on the bench who held that the insurance statute was ultra vires;
only the Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Davis voted to uphold the
measure. Speaking for the majority of the Court Mr. Justice Rinfret
rejected federal counsels' argument in its entirety: "Insurance of
all sorts," he averred, "including insurance against unemployment
and health insurance, have always been recognized as being exclu-
sively provincial matters under the head 'Property and Civil Rights,'
or under the head 'Matters of a merely local and private nature in
the Province.'"94 Referring to the recitals in the preamble of the
Act he rejected almost with scorn the federal contention that the
Dominion in the exercise of its unlimited taxing powers could create
a national fund which could be used for the specific purpose of setting
up an unemployment insurance scheme:
* . . the provisions for levying contributions for the creation of the
national fund were nothing more than provisions to enable the carrying
out of the true and only purpose of the legislation. The Act is one dealing
wvith and regulating employment service and unemployment insurance.
The contributions (or the taxes, if we are to call them so) are mere inci-
dents of the regulation.95
If he had been speaking with complete candour, Rinfret might have
said that the attempted validation of the legislation under the taxing
power was a mere fagade by which counsel were trying to circumvent
the obstacle of Judicial Committee precedent.
In his dissenting opinion, the Chief Justice would have upheld
the measure under the taxing power,96 and the double aspect doctrine.
89 See the Factums of British Columbia, pp. 1-2; Quebec, p. 10 (and there-
fore also New Brunswick); Alberta, p. 1; Manitoba, p. 1; Saskatchewan, p. 1,
and Ontario, pp. 34. (Social Insurance file, Supreme Court Library, Ottawa).
90 Factum of British Columbia, 2.
91 Factum of Quebec, 11.
92 New Brunswick adopted the entire pleadings of Quebec.
93 Factum of Ontario, 6.
94 1936 S.C.R. at 451.
95 Id. at 453.
96 Cf. Duff, Id. at 438, "... it is entirely competent to Parliament to
resort, as sources for the provision of the unemployment fund, to taxes levied
on employers and employees and to taxes levied 'by any mode or system'
which Parliament may in its discretion adopt."
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An unemployment insurance scheme might incidentally trench on
property and civil rights so long as, in its paramount aspect, it was
dealing with subject matter of national scope and importance. 97
Running through the majority opinion was the notion expressed
so lucidly by Rinfret that all types of insurance without exception
belonged to the provincial domain; Duff's dissenting view is interest-
ing in that, although he professes to disagree with Rinfret, he does
place so much emphasis on upholding the contentious measure under
the taxing power, or the double-aspect doctrine, rather than as an
ordinary insurance statute. Both factions of the court appear to have
agreed that the insurance precedents were of great importance. Rin-
fret's sweeping generalization that insurance as a category belonged
to provincial jurisdiction might have been more effectively questioned
had counsel for the Dominion drawn a sharper distinction between
the ordinary classes of commercial insurance and the proposed un-
employment insurance measure which belonged, surely, to a newer
category of social insurance. Ordinary commercial insurance, whether
it guarded against fire, theft, loss of life or property was essentially
a contract of indemnity protecting contracting individuals against
stipulated risks upon the voluntary payment of a premium. Unemploy-
ment insurance, on the other hand, was designed to protect a large
segment of the entire labouring force from a social evil which had
faced them with increasing severity since 1929, by compulsorily levy-
ing a tax which everyone within the specified class had to pay. There
was a comprehensiveness and a broad social purpose in unemploy-
ment insurance which ordinary commercial insurance lacked. To
draw an analogy between the two, as Rinfret did for the purpose
of asserting jurisdiction over the whole class of insurance, was
dubious.
Counsel who were attempting to sustain the validity of a federal
unemployment insurance measure were labouring under a grave diffi-
culty. Neither the Supreme Court of Canada nor the Judicial Com-
mittee were noted for taking the broad social implications of legisla-
tion into account when deliberating on its validity. An innovating
measure like this new type of insurance, according to the prevailing
judicial conservatism, was most likely to be dealt with as were other
types of insurance. This was especially the case where the statute
was not framed expressly to meet the exigencies of a particular
emergency, but by its own terms was a permanent measure-it could
not, in other words, be upheld under the "emergency" doctrine enun-
ciated by Lord Haldane (although in retrospect it is highly question-
able whether the residuary power is invocable only in an emergency,
as Haldane appeared to hold9 8). It seems obvious that federal counsel
97 Id. at 443-444.
98 Toronto Electric Commissioners v. Snider, [1925) A.C. 396. It is note-
worthy that in an obiter-dictum in Proprietary Articles Trade Association
v. Attorney General for Canada, [1931] A.C. 310, Lord Atkin, who subsequent-
ly wrote four of the five judgments in the New Deal cases, sharply questioned
Haldane's apparent narrowing of the extension of the residuary clause in the
above case.
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who were not prepared to argue that the insurance measure was called
forth by exceptional circumstances to meet a great social evil would
be confronted with great difficulty in persuading the courts that the
Act was valid. However, despite the Snider precedent, the composi-
tion of the Judicial Committee shifts from case to case and Haldane
was now gone. If federal counsel had not succumbed to undue timidity
in the face of the recent Snider precedent and had invoked the broader
version of the dimensions doctrine in vogue before that precedent
was fashioned, they might have convinced either the Supreme Court
of Canada or the Judicial Committee that Haldane's 1925 test was
unduly narrow. Had the courts in 1936 and 1937 applied the broader
test of the validity of federal enactments under the residuary power
that Lord Simon applied in 1946, 99 it is possible that more of the
New Deal legislation could have been upheld, despite the fact that
it was framed as permanent in duration:
To legislate for prevention appears to be on the same basis as legisla-
tion for cure. A pestilence has been given as an example of a subject
so affecting, or which might so affect, the whole Dominion that it wouldjustify legislation by the Parliament of Canada as a matter concerning
the order and good government of the Dominion. It would seem to
follow that if Parliament could legislate where there was an actual
epidemic it could do so to prevent one occurring and also to prevent
it happening again.1 00
In so far as the different New Deal measures were designed to prevent
the reoccurrence of adverse economic conditions, for example, the
Natural Products Marketing Act and section 14 of the Dominion
Trade and Industry Commission Act, both of which were found in-
valid, Lord Simon's 1946 test would have done much to sustain them.
In the Natural Products Marketing Act reference, Duff spoke
for a unanimous court in holding the Act ultra vires:
... this statute attempts and, indeed, professes, to regulate in the pro-
vinces of Canada, by the instrumentality of a commission or commis-
sions appointed under the authority of the statute, trade in individual
commodities and classes of commodities. The powers of regulation
vested in the commissions extend to external trade and matters con-
nected therewith and to trade in matters of interprovincial concern; but
also to trade which is entirely local and of purely local concern.
Regulation of individual trades, or trades in individual commodi-
ties in this sweeping fashion, is not competent to the Parliament of
Canada and such a scheme of regulation is not practicable
"in view of the distribution of legislative powers enacted in the
Constitution Act, without the cooperation of the provincial legisla-
tures" (1922 1 A.C. 191 at 201).
to quote from the judgment of the Judicial Committee in the Board of
Commerce case. 10 1
In the above reference, two strong precedents suggested that the
legislation under review was invalid. The Board of Commerce case102
99 A.-G. for Ontario v. Canada Temperance Federation, [1946] A.C. 193, and
see P. RUSSELL, LnADING CONSTITUTIONAL DEcIsIoNs, (Toronto, 1965) 51 ff.100 A.-G. for Ontario v. Canada Temperance Federation, [1946] A.C. at
207-208.101 [1936] S.C.R. 426.
102 [1922] 1 A.C. 191.
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and The King v. Eastern Terminal Elevator Co.103 had both declared
federal legislation regulating local transactions to be unconstitutional,
even if the local regulation were merely incidental to a larger pur-
pose. It was only in the 1950s in certain marketing references that
the Court adopted a more permissive attitude towards marketing
regulation by the federal government. 104
Speaking again for a unanimous bench, Duff held that the agree-
ments envisaged by section 14 of the Dominion Trade and Industry
Commission Act, to prevent undue competition, were ultra vires. Their
invalidity stemmed from the fact that like some of the agreements
contemplated by the Natural Products Marketing Act they would
involve purely intra-provincial transactions under the jurisdiction of
the provinces.' 05 The brief judgment also struck down the federal
power to create a Dominion trade mark "C.S." or "Canada Standard"
(contrived to assure the public of minimum standards in marketed
commodities) on the ground that as a 'novel civil right' it invaded the
sphere of section 92 (13) .106
The measures which were upheld by the Court in their entirety
were the Farmers' Creditors Arrangement Act, 1934,107 and section
498A of the Criminal Code.108 In the case of the Farmers' Creditors
Arrangement Act, the court held that Parliament was dealing sub-
stantially with the same class of persons whom it customarily dealt
with when exercising its undoubted power over "bankruptcy and
insolvency", and was dealing with situations closely analogous to the
traditional category of bankruptcy under English or Canadian law.
In the case of the amendment to the Criminal Code, having regard
to the impossibility of defining what constituted a crime in vacuo
(notwithstanding the learned demurrers, proceeding almost from
natural law premises, of Cannon and Crocket), the majority held
that Parliament was here dealing with certain behaviour which in
its own judgment it deemed to be manifestly undesirable, and to
which it attached penal consequences. The Court found this not dis-
similar to other criminal prohibitions and had no difficulty in uphold-
ing the new section.
Taking a general view of the New Deal litigation before the
Supreme Court, it would appear that with Mr. Justice Lamont absent
through illness the remaining six members of the Court were about
evenly divided between provincialist-leaning members, consisting of
Cannon, Crocket and Rinfret, and the moderates, Duff, Davis and
103 [1925] S.C.R. 434.
104 Cf. Reference re the Farm Products Marketing Act (Ontario), [1957]
S.C.R. 198, and see RUSSELL, LEADING CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONS, supra note
99, at 101-102.
105 [1936] S.C.R. at 381-382.
106 Id. at 382-383.
107 Id. at 384.
108 Id. at 363.
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Kerwin, who could not really be classified as "centralists", but who
were more disposed than their brethren to uphold federal legislation
if, in their opinion, the weight of precedent was not an undue barrier.
The previous political affiliations of members of the Court cannot
be completely discounted, but provincialist bias was decidedly more
important as a determinant of the decisions. Crocket, for example,
with a strong Conservative background, and Cannon and Rinfret
with equally strong Liberal ones, were ranged alike against the
economic centralism they perceived in the statutes. It is noteworthy,
too, that Duff's own Liberal background did not cause him to vote
against a Tory legislative programme in the case of the more far-
ranging statutes, namely, the treaty legislation and the unemploy-
ment insurance statute.
A court with leanings like the foregoing, moreover, was bound to
be influenced negatively by certain features of the Dominion's plead-
ings, some unavoidable and others avoidable. The virtual capitulation
of federal counsel to Haldane's view that the residuary power was
applicable only in "emergencies" can be seen in their exertions to
circumvent precedent by invoking the treaty power to uphold the
labour legislation and the taxing power to uphold unemployment
insurance. The relegation of the peace, order and good government
clause to a distinctly secondary place in the factums and the failure
to urge the "dimensions" doctrine in their oral or written pleadings,
along with their strong urging of other more circuitous grounds,
appeared almost to be a concession that the peace, order and good
government clause was of little assistance to the federal case.
The credibility of the federal argument was seriously affected
by the indirection with which the I.L.O. statutes and the unemploy-
ment insurance statute were defended by federal counsel, with the
treaty power being the deus ex machina in the former case and the
taxing power in the latter one. The emphasis in the factums, especially
in the Labour Conventions case, tended to crystallize the legal argu-
ment not around the basic issue of the validity of the contentious
legislation, but around the mechanics by which federal counsel
thought they might avoid the treacherous ground of property and
civil rights. These devices, moreover, instead of making the federal
case more plausible, made it more vulnerable by exposing side-issues
to attack by a Court half of whose members were biased in favour
of the provinces to begin with. Had federal counsel avoided the
irritant of the treaty power, and relied mainly on the peace, order
and good government clause, invoking the dimensions doctrine, they
would have found a stronger ally in Ontario and presented a more
forceful case before the Court.
The New Deal Before the Judicial Committee
In the second stage of the New Deal litigation, which took place
before the Judicial Committee in November, 1936, almost all of the
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legislation which had been placed in issue before the Supreme Court
of Canada earlier in the year was before the Board.109
Siting on the Judicial Committee panel which heard the appeals
were Lord Atkin of Aberdovery, who delivered all but one of the
ultimate New Deal decisions; Lord Macmillan, Lord Wright, Lord
Thankerton"0 and Sir Sidney Rowlatt. It should be noted that except
for Lord Macmillan, who had served as standing counsel for Canada
before the Judicial Committee when a practicing barrister,11 1 and who
headed Prime Minister Bennett's Royal Commission on Canadian
Banking and Currency, none of the Board was well versed in Cana-
dian constitutional law, or had much local knowledge of Canadian
social conditions. Lord Atkin's field of expertise were commercial law
and the law of tort-he was particularly known for his thorough
knowledge of the London Stock Exchange. 112 Thankerton had served
as a Unionist M.P. for South Lanarkshire from 1913-1918, and during
his later parliamentary career had served as Solicitor General for
Scotland.113 Lord Wright had served as a judge of the High Court
(1925-1935) and as Master of the Rolls (1935-37) ,114 and Sir Sidney
Rowlatt was a 'taxing judge' who in 1917-18 was chairman of the
Indian Sedition Committee,1 5 and whose career discloses a closer as-
sociation with India than with Canada.
There was no noteworthy change of emphasis in either forensic
tactics or argument by federal or provincial counsel before the Judi-
cial Committee. Counsel for the Dominion continued to invoke the
treaty and taxing powers in an effort to have the three labour con-
ventions and the unemployment insurance upheld. There was still a
marked reluctance by federal counsel to invoke serious economic
109 An important exception was section 14 of the Dominion Trade and
Industry Commission Act, which permitted agreements among industrialists
to eliminate "wasteful or demoralizing" competition, and which was declared
ultra vires by the Supreme Court of Canada for encroaching on the provin-
cial head of property and civil rights. When Ontario appealed certain sections
of the Act which had been found valid by the Supreme Court, the Dominion
cross-appealed with respect to sections 18 and 19, but not respecting section
14. It is noteworthy that section 14 had been severely criticized by the Liberals
in Parliament, notably by J. L. llsley (Official Report of Debates, June 11,
1935, p. 3525) and F. A. McGregor, the registrar of the Combines Investiga-
tion Act and an influential associate of Mackenzie King complained in vigour-
ous terms about the statute's proposed displacement of the Act of which he
was overseer to both Mr. King and Mr. Bennett (interview with Finlayson,
March 23, 1966).
110 Lord Thankerton was born William Watson, and was the third son
of the Lord Watson who had delivered so many important decisions some
forty years earlier on the Canadian Constitution.
111 LORD MACILmLAN, A MAN or LAw's TALE, (London, 1953) 140.
112 The New York Times, Monday, June 26, 1944, at 15.
113 The London Times, Monday, June 14, 1948, at 7.
114 Atkin and Wright were both incensed by German brutality during
the Second World War, see Wright, The Killing of Hostages as a War Crime,
in Tnm BRIsH YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAw (1948).115 The London Times, Saturday, March 3, 1945, at 7.
1968]
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
conditions as a ground for upholding the legislation." 6 In the ultimate
hearings R. S. Robertson, K.C., (who himself was later appointed
Chief Justice of Ontario) replaced Rowell, who had been elevated to
the bench, as St. Laurent's associate before the Judicial Committee. It
might be suggested that Rowell, with his relevant political experience
and his presence at the I.L.O. Convention in Washington in 1919, could
have argued the ultimate appeals more forcefully than did Robertson,
who was engaged principally in the fields of municipal and corporation
law. There is little question that Rowell was a more learned constitu-
tional lawyer than Robertson." 7 Argument by federal counsel before
the Board was not always trenchant or persuasive. In the I.L.O. case,
for example, Robertson initially admitted that the subject matter of
the statutes "ordinarily" came within section 92 but contended that it
could be taken out of that section by the federal treaty power. When
Atkin observed that this was a "far-reaching doctrine" which could
seriously affect provincial rights, Robertson rather blandly replied,
without attempting to negate the thrust of Atkin's question, that such
a power could not be exercised by Canada alone but that another
country would have to be found to complete the bargain." 8
In his judgment in the I.L.O. case, Lord Atkin held that the
subject-matter of the labour conventions under review fell under
provincial jurisdiction. Ratification of the applicable international
agreements, moreover, did not enlarge the Dominion's legislative
capacity:
... the legislative powers remain distributed, and if in the exercise of her
new functions derived from her new international status Canada incurs
international obligations, they must, so far as legislation be concerned,
when they deal with provincial classes of subjects, be dealt with by the
totality of powers, in other words, by co-operation between the Dominion
and the Provinces. While the ship of state now sails on larger ventures
and into foreign waters she still retains the water-tight compartments
which are an essential part of her original structure.11 9
Atkin, accordingly, rejected the constitutional validity of all three
I.L.O. statutes on the ground that section 132 did not apply, the con-
ventions in question not being 'Empire' treaties. The assumption of
an international obligation by the Dominion, he held, did not modify
the distribution of powers in the B.N.A. Act-where provincial subject
116 of, "I am not of the opinion now, nor was I when I was retained with
Hon. N. W. Rowell to submit such reasons as might seem appropriate to
support the legislation, that it would have made any difference in the result
to invoke for instance the serious economical depression of the thirties tojustify the hours of work and minimum wages legislation. .." Rt. Hon. L. S.
St. Laurent to author, December 28, 1965.
117 R. K. Finlayson vouches for the authenticity of an incident during
the I.L.O. case in which a member of the Board asked Robertson whether
the Dominion could be changed into a unilingual state by the ratification of an
agreement like those under study. His answer was reportedly an unqualified
affirmative. Such a reply would apparently be incorrect because of the
'entrenchment' of French by, for instance, section 133.
118 The London Times, Saturday, November 14, 1936, 4, and 1937 [A.C.]
330.
119 [19371 A.C. 354.
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matter was involved in a treaty, the legislative cooperation of the
provinces was essential before the treaty could be implemented. In
arriving at his decision Lord Atkin distinguished the Aeronautics
120
and Radio121 cases, two precedents which had been greatly relied on
by federal counsel, from the instant case. In the former case, an
'Empire' treaty was involved, in the latter one, he contended, the sub-
ject matter was federal apart from the treaty and hence the Dominion
could pass the required legislation without difficulty.122
The judgment of their Lordships, was, moreover, not free from
serious factual error, as Mr. Robertson later pointed out in his memo-
randum to the Deputy Minister of Justice. 2 3 Speaking of the lower
court judgment in the Labour Conventions case Atkin said:
... No obligation to legislate in respect of any of the matters in question
arose until the Canadian executive, left with an unfettered discretion, of
their own volition acceded to the conventions, a novus actus not deter-
mined by the treaty. For the purpose of this legislation the obligations
arose under the conventions alone. It appears that all the members of the
Supreme Court rejected the contention based on s. 132 and their Lordships
are in full agreement with them.124
But Duff had said expressly in his judgment, concurred in by Davis
and Kerwin, "... this treaty obligation is an obligation under section
132 and consequently.., authority to make the convention effective
exclusively rests in the Parliament and Government of Canada."'12 5 Far
from the unanimity against the applicability of section 132 asserted by
Atkin, there was an equal division of judges, half of whom contended
that section 132 did apply. This was a major error on the part of the
Board. One can see here perhaps, the psychological impact of three
concurring judgments each of which asserted the inapplicability of
section 132 alongside one judgment only, endorsed however by three
judges, holding the opposite.
Because of the tradition of Privy Council secrecy, and the con-
vention that advice to His Majesty must never be conflicting, which
still prevailed in 1937, it is difficult to discover how the Board divided
in its in camera deliberations. However it is probable, as he later in-
120 [1932] A.C. 54.
121 [1932) A.C. 304.
122 While there is general agreement that Lord Atkin was correct in
dismissing the Aeronautics case as a governing precedent, there is more doubt
concerning his distinguishing of the Radio case. In the latter case, Lord
Dunedin had apparently based the treaty-implementing power on the residu.
ary clause (see [1932] A.C. at 312), see the remarks by Lederman in Legis-
Lative Power to Implement Treaty Obligations in Canada, in J. H. AiTcHISoN
ed., The Political Process in Canada, (Toronto, 1963). And federal counsel were
not convinced by Atkin's reasoning, see "R. S. Robertson K.C., to Deputy
Minister of Justice, re Constitutional Conventions," March, 1937, Lapointe
Papers, (P.A.C.): ". . . the most careful reading of the language used by
their Lordships in the Radio case suggests that their Lordships were not
prepared to accept all that their Lordships said on that occasion as binding
on them."
123 See the work by Robertson cited in footnote 122 supra.
124 [1937] A.C. 350, emphasis added.
125 [1936) S.C.R. 500.
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timated,126 that Lord Wright dissented in both the Labour Conventions
and unemployment insurance cases. In an obituary of Sir Lyman Duff,
Lord Wright first reviews the findings of both tribunals, and then
refers to the ultimate bestowal of unemployment insurance on the
federal power in 1940, with provincial consent, adding: "All this seems
to justify Sir Lyman's practical sense, and it may be his legal sense,
of what was the correct construction and effect of the legislative
measures involved."127
In the other cases, Atkin found the unemployment insurance
statute invalid for reasons very similar to those enunciated in the
Supreme Court by Rinfret,128 and the opinion of the Board invalidating
the Natural Products Marketing Act explicitly endorsed the reasoning
in the Court below by Chief Justice Duff, at least respecting the at-
tempt to uphold the legislation under the residuary power.129 While
the Board was cognizant that all nine provinces had enacted comple-
mentary legislation so that both local and interprovincial marketing
could be regulated in a comprehensive scheme, it still found that the
marketing scheme was invalid. Referring to the need for legislative
cooperation, Atkin observed, ..... the legislation will have to be care-
fully framed, and will not be achieved by either party leaving its own
sphere and encroaching upon that of the other."' 30 The invalidity in
this case stemmed from the fact that the federal statute purportedly
authorized the regulation of purely local marketing transactions.
In the Dominion Trade and Industry Commission Act appeal,
their Lordships agreed with the Court below, except for finding ss. 18
and 19 intra vires.131 These sections vested the national trade-mark
"Canada Standard" in the Dominion. As has been mentioned, there
was no appeal by the Dominion respecting section 14, which was found
invalid by the Supreme Court. 32
Like the Supreme Court of Canada, the Privy Council upheld the
constitutionality of both Section 498A of the Criminal Code and the
Farmers' Creditors Arrangement Act. Atkin rather sharply rejected
Crocket's dissent in the former case which was based almost on nat-
ural law premises in that the New Brunswick judge asserted that an
intent to do wrong was the characteristic feature of crime. Atkin held,
contrarily, on the basis of the Proprietary Articles case,133 that "there
is no other criterion of 'wrongness' than the intent of the legislature
in the public interest to prohibit the act or omission made criminal.' 34
126 Lord Wright of Durley, Rt. Hon. Sir Lyman Poore Duff, 1865-1955,
(1955) 33 CAwT. B. RnV.
127 Id. at 1129.
128 Cf. "1... But assuming that the Dominion has collected by means of
taxation a fund, it by no means follows that any legislation which disposes
of it is necessarily within Dominion competence. It may still be legislation
affecting the classes of subjects enumerated in s. 92, and, if so, would be
ultra vires." [1937] A.C. at 366.
129 [1937] A.C. at 387.
130 Id. at 389.
131 [1937] A.C. at 418.
132 See supra note 109.
133 [1931] A.C. 310.
134 [1937] A.C. at 375.
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Speaking for the Board, Lord Thankerton rejected the provincial
contention that the Farmers' Creditors Arrangement Act was 'confis-
catorial legislation' allowing debtors, in effect, to force a new contract
on their creditors, secured and unsecured alike. 135 He asserted that
".... it cannot be maintained that legislative provisions as to composi-
tions, by which bankruptcy is avoided, but which assumes insolvency,
is not properly within the sphere of bankruptcy legislation."' 36 The
statute therefore came within head 21 of section 91 and was valid
legislation respecting 'Bankruptcy and Insolvency.'
As a result of the appeals, the Judicial Committee found five
statutes of great social importance unconstitutional, namely, the three
I.L.O. statutes (which had not been declared invalid by the lower
court); the Natural Products Marketing Act and the Employment and
Social Insurance Act. The Board agreed with the Supreme Court,
however, that section 498A of the Criminal Code and the Farmers'
Creditors Arrangement Act were constitutional. Although the Judicial
Committee did not rehabilitate sections 18 and 19 of the Dominion
Trade and Industry Commission Act, it manifested a more severe
attitude toward the New Deal than did the lower court by invalidating
the I.L.O. statutes in such terms that some scholars felt that the fed-
eral treaty power would be permanently curtailed, as well as the
federal power to enact social legislation. 137
Although precedent played an important part in the outcome of
the decisions, there is some indication that extra-legal factors also had
an impact on the result. None of their Lordships, save possibly Lord
Macmillan, had any extensive acquaintanceship with Canadian consti-
tutional law or Canadian social conditions. None of them, for example,
had sat on the Board which disposed of the Radio case just five years
previously, 138 although Atkin and Macmillan did serve on the Aero-
nautics Board.139 From a distance of thousands of miles it must have
seemed to their Lordships, with the provinces ranged instransigently
against the Dominion, that a states' rights conflict was raging in
Canada which might well tear the country asunder.
In addition to the general lack of familiarity with Canadian Law
and Canada, the personal backgrounds of some members of the Board
could well have inclined them towards adopting a provincialist position.
No less a jurist than Duff himself reportedly attributed the result of
the Labour Conventions appeal to Atkin's experience with Australian
federalism' 4° (Atkin's father was a member of the Queensland state
135 See the argument of I. A. Humphries, K.C., for the Attorney-General
of Ontario [1937] A.C. at 396.
136 [1937] A.C. 403.
137 See, e.g., Scott, "Centralization and Decentralization in Canadian
Federalism." (1951) 29 CAw. B. Rv. and Szablowski, "Creation and Imple-
mentation of Treaties in Canada," (1956) 34 CAx. B. Rv.
138 The members of the Board in the Radio case were Viscount Dunedin,
Lord Blanesburgh, Lord Merrivale, Lord Russell of Killowen and Sir George
Lowndes.
139 Along with Lords Sankey, Dunedin and Russell of Killowen.
140 The remark was made to a mutual acquaintance of Duff and R. K.
Finlayson.
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legislature). In abstract theory, at any rate, Australia possessed a
more decentralized federalism than the Canadian form.141 Atkin's ex-
perience with the Australian residuary power, for instance, might lead
him to draw inferences about a federal structure of government which
were inapplicable to the Canadian context.
The relative forensic abilities of opposing counsel would also be
a not inconsiderable factor in the result. Where judges are relatively
ignorant of local law, as most members of the 1937 panel were, one of
the duties of counsel was surely to instruct and enlighten their Lord-
ships on the compatibility of the New Deal statutes with the Canadian
Constitution. Searching questions by the Board, especially from Atkin
and Macmillan, emphasized that they were leaning heavily on counsel
in order to grasp the diverse ramifications of the New Deal measures.
In such a case, the absence of Rowell, recently elevated to the Ontario
bench, would have a noticeable impact. Not only was he the superior
as a constitutional lawyer to anyone appearing before the 1937 Board,
but also he had had actual experience at the 1919 I.L.O. Conference in
Washington as a Canadian representative. His replacement was a
municipal lawyer.
A final extra-legal element in the Labour Conventions case which
could have been of decisive importance was Atkin's egregious blunder
in his statement that none of the Canadian judges in the Court below
had held that s. 132 was applicable. In fact, three out of six had so
held.
The Practical Effects of the Decisions
One fairly immediate result of the judicial nullification of the
Employment and Social Insurance Act was the securing from West-
minister in August, 1940, of an amendment to the B.N.A. Act trans-
ferring jurisdiction over unemployment insurance to the Dominion. 142
The apparent restriction of the treaty power by the Judicial Com-
mittee has caused anxiety to many Canadian jurists since 1937. More
expansive judicial interpretation of the peace, order and good govern-
ment clause, for example in the case of Johanneson v. Rural Municipal-
ity of West Saint Paul,'43 has led some legal scholars to see in the re-
siduary clause a possible source of rehabilitation of the federal treaty-
implementing power.144 In that case, there was a jurisdictional con-
flict over the respective capacities asserted on behalf of the Manitoba
Legislature and of Parliament to regulate the location of aerodromes.
The respondents, who sought to uphold the provincial power, argued
that the federal legislation rested on the Aeronautics Convention (an
'Empire' treaty) which had been superseded by the Chicago Conven-
tion. From the moment the Chicago Convention was in force, they
141 Cf. K. C. Wheare, however, in FEDERAL GOVERNmNT (4th ed., London,
1963) at 109 ff. where he discusses 'centralizing' tendencies in both Australia
and Canada.
142 M. OLLIVIER, PROBLEMS OF CANADIAN SOVEREIGNTY, (Toronto, 1945) 377-378.
143 [1952] S.C.R. 292.
144 See Szablowski supra, note 137, at 58-59
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argued, the Dominion ceased to have the power to enact implementing
legislation under section 132, which was applicable only to the earlier
agreement. The Supreme Court of Canada held, however, that federal
implementing legislation under the later agreement was valid by virtue
of the residuary clause, because of the national importance of civil
aviation. Concerning this case, Professor Peter H. Russell has observed
that although the Court could apparently remain within the doctrine
of stare decisis by "referring to Lord Simon's formulation of the
national aspect test and Lord Sankey's allusion to the national import-
ance of Aeronautics in the Aeronautics Reference of 1932" that actu-
ally the court might equally well have decided to frustrate the federal
legislation by invoking Atkin's Labour Conventions decision as a pre-
cedent.145
Dr. T. W. L. MacDermot, a former Canadian ambassador to Israel
and Greece and High Commissioner to Australia and South Africa,
whose diplomatic appointments followed Atkin's judgment, has noted
that there were no undue difficulties presented in negotiating or imple-
menting treaties because of the I.L.O. precedent, largely because many
such treaties relate, clearly, to matters falling within Article 91, such
as agreements on Defence, trade and commerce and the like.146
The Department of External Affairs, however, has been wary of
provincial susceptibilities since Atkin's judgment and has inserted a
'federal-state clause' in some international agreements, advising other
countries of Canada's incapacity to legislate on matters lying within
provincial jurisdiction, even though a treaty involving them has been
negotiated. 147 The apparent lack of federal-provincial friction over
treaty making noted by Dr. MacDermot, accordingly, may have been
due to some extent to the exercise of restraint on behalf of the federal
government over the type of treaty that will be negotiated.148
The quashing of the Natural Products Marketing Act has taxed
the ingenuity of draftsmen seeking to overcome the difficulties pre-
sented to any co-operative marketing scheme by the judgment. As Mr.
Justice Rand has remarked: "What has emerged so far is the device
of co-operative regulation of marketing by a single Board appointed
by both Dominion and Province; how far this will be satisfactory re-
mains to be seen."'149 As Rand has suggested, this rather cumbersome
device does not facilitate the centralized control of the economy that
is rapidly becoming necessary.150
With respect to the other statutes, the Dominion Trade and In-
dustry Commission Act remained technically in effect (except for sec-
145 Russell, The Supreme Court's Interpretation of the Constitution Since
1949, in P. Fox, PoLITics: CANADA (Toronto, 1963) 67.
146 Interview with Dr. MacDermot, March 1, 1966.
147 See J.-G. CASTEL, INTERNATIONAL LAW CHIEFLY AS INTERPRETED AND
APPLIED Ml CANADA (Toronto, 1965) 865 ff.
148 The recent assertion of a qualified treaty-power by Quebec, of course,
has revived the issue.
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tion 14) until December, 1949, when it was repealed, but in the interim
the Liberals virtually ignored it, preferring to work through their own
Combines Investigation Act. An amended version of the Farmers'
Creditors Arrangement Acts 1 is in operation in the prairie provinces
alone,152 while section 498A of the Criminal Code, subsequently incor-
porated in section 412 of the revised Code, has been, ironically, con-
solidated in the Combines Investigation Act.153
The principal result of the invalidation at one stroke by the Judi-
cial Committee of five Canadian statutes of such broad social signifi-
cance was to make the judicial review of Canadian cases by a non-
Canadian tribunal a political issue. After most of the New Deal statutes
were invalidated by the Privy Council, the controversy passed from
the judicial to the political forum and Canadians were confronted
starkly with the question of whether they should - or could - estab-
lish an ultimate court of appeal in Canada.
The Agitation to Abolish Overseas Appeals
Although the agitation for the abolition of Canadian appeals to
the Judicial Committee existed long before the 1937 decisions,154 ad-
verse reaction in Canada to the decisions gave the movement for aboli-
tion a new impetus as it provided a graphic current illustration of the
disadvantages of a transoceanic appellate body, emphasizing the re-
moteness and lack of local rapport of the Board.
In the House of Common's Hon. C. H. Cahan, Bennett's former
Secretary of State, deplored what he considered to be the whole pro-
vincialistic tendency of interpretation of the Privy Council, especially
the judgments of Watson and Haldane which, he said, had virtually
obliterated the residuary clause as a meaningful source of federal
power. While he was not noted as an advocate of social reform, he
vigorously condemned the decisions invalidating most of the New
Deal, charging that the action of the Board was both highhanded and
careless.155 The logical answer, according to Cahan, was the abolition
of overseas appeals. Accordingly, he presented his Bill for this purpose
to the House of Commons on April 10, 1938. His sponsorship of a pri-
vate member's Bill for this purpose was facilitated by Ernest Lapointe,
who had privately shown sympathy towards Cahan's proposal. It was,
however, agreed between them that the Bill would be withdrawn tem-
porarily until professional advice on its merits could be obtained from
various bar associations. 56 The co-operation between Lapointe and
151 S.C. 194344, c. 26; R.S.C. 1952, c. 111.
152 Under the amended statute only one application can be made by an
individual farmer under the Act, and a decision by a board of review is
appealable to the provincial supreme court, see the amendment referred to
in footnote 151 supra.
153 Brecher, Combines and Competition: A Re-AppraisaZ of Canadian
Public Policy, (1960) 38 CAw. B. REV. 588.
154 Cf. e.g., Ewart Canada's Political Status (1928) 9, The Canadian
Historical Review, and Scott, The Privy Council and Minority Rights, (1930)
382 Queen's Quarterly, and concerning Justice Minister Fournier's attempt to
abolish appeals in 1875 see RUSSELL supra, note 29, at 37-38.
155 Official Report of Debates, April 8, 1938.
156 Cahan to C. M. Woodsworth, 15 June, 1938, Cahan Papers (P.A.C.).
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Cahan shows that by 1938 both major parties had come to the con-
clusion that overseas appeals were an anachronism. 157 Cahan's spon-
sorship of the Bill, in fact, was convenient for Lapointe since, had he,
as a prime originator of the New Deal references, personally sponsored
a Bill for this purpose it would have looked almost like a confession of
wrongdoing; he would have been subject to the taunt that he was the
author of his own misfortunes. By giving covert encouragement to
Cahan15 8 and maintaining an ambiguous posture in Parliament he
could make it appear as if he were a disinterested spectator weighing
the merits and demerits alike of a decision that was possibly now re-
quired in view of Canada's recent accession to sovereignty.
In the following year, Cahan reintroduced his Bill with the private
concurrence of Lapointe. He informed Professor W. P. M. Kennedy of
Lapointe's interest and assistance in a letter sent just before the second
reading of the Bill:
I have discussed Bill number 9 with Mr. Lapointe, the Minister of Justice,
and he has promised that when I move the second reading of the bill on
Friday evening next, he will annouce that the government has decided to
refer the bill to the Supreme Court of Canada and thence to the JudicialCommittee for an opinion as to whether the terms of the bill are within
the legislative jurisdiction of Parliament.1 59
Cahan, therefore, agreed to suspend temporarily further action on his
Bill on the understanding that the government would proceed with
references to determine the legality of the abolition of appeals. 60
A serious question existed, however, about whether Parliament,
by federal legislation, could cut off appeals to the Judicial Committee
from provincial courts, or on points of provincial law. Provincial ap-
peals had been envisaged in some cases by local laws passed before
Confederation and continued in effect by section 129 of the B.N.A.
Act. It might be contended, also, that the provinces could provide for
their own appellate system under their power to provide for the "Ad-
ministration of Justice in the Province."'161 The effect of Clause 3 of
Cahan's Bill,162 as P. B. Mignault, a former judge of the Supreme Court
157 The Canadian Press reported that, outside the Social Credit group,Vincent Pottier, Liberal M.P. for Shelburne-Yarmouth-Clare, was the only
opponent of abolition in the House of Commons. See The Fort William Times-
Journal, Wednesday, February 9, 1938, at 1.
158 See W. P. M. Kennedy to Cahan, February 13, 1938, where, on the
basis of private information the former said concerning Cahan's Bill: "Ibelieve you will have Mr. Lapointe's 'unofficial' approval and that time will be
given to you." See also Kennedy to Cahan, 11 May, 1938, and Cahan to Alex-
ander Johnson, 25 April, 1938, Cahan Papers.
159 Cahan to W. P. M. Kennedy, 13 April, 1939, Cahan Papers.
160 Order-in-Council P.C. 908 dated 21 April, 1939 initiated a reference
to the Supreme Court of Canada to determine the legal capacity of Parliament
to abolish Canadian appeals to the Privy Council.161 See section 92(14) of the B.N.A. Act.
162 Clause 3 reads: "Notwithstanding any royal prerogative or anything
contained in the Interpretation Act or the Supreme Court Act or in any
other Act of the Parliament of Canada no appeal shall lie or be broughtfrom any judgment or order of any court in Canada, in relation to any
matter within the competence of the Parliament of Canada, to any court
of appeal, tribunal or authority by which, in the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Ireland, appeals and petitions to His Majesty in Council may be
heard."
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pointed out to Cahan, would be to abolish appeals on Dominion laws
only. "By the very general language of section 3, and the words 'any
Court in Canada'," Mignault asked, "do you proprose to take away the
appeal, by leave or statute, from Provincial Courts? Can Parliament
do so?"'163 Cahan admitted that his reticence in failing expressly from
precluding provincial appeals in his Bill was dictated by prudence: "If
I sought by express terms to abolish appeals to the Judicial Committee
from provincial courts, I would raise such a storm of opposition from
provincial governments that the Bill would probably have to be aban-
doned. 16 4 Cahan's reference here to the abolition of "appeals... from
provincial courts," showed his appreciation of the constitutional diffi-
culties involved in purporting, through purely federal legislation, to
cut off appeals from either provincial courts or from any Canadian
courts on questions of provincial law.
In the wake of the New Deal decisions, Cahan's agitation to
abolish appeals stirred a vigorous constitutional debate in Canadian
journals. Several influential newspapers favoured retention. The Mont-
real Gazette which had emphatically opposed Bennett's legislation,
castigated abolition as 'unsportsmanlike. ' 165 The Hamilton Spectator
hailed the lack of political bias of the Judicial Committee, 166 and the
Toronto Telegram suggested not abolition but reform: "... . critics of
the Privy Council would be better employed in endeavouring to secure
a reconstitution of that body in a form more in keeping with the
present status of members of the Commonwealth."' 167 The Toronto
Globe and Mail suggested that even "fuller use" of "the Empire's
ability and genius" should be employed, instead of abolition.168
There was, however, a growing call for abolition. The Ottawa
Journal criticized their Lordships' lack of local knowledge: "In recent
years in particular Privy Council decisions have shown hardly an ink-
ling of things in Canada in consequence of modern and Empire change
•.. Privy Council appeals weaken rather than strengthen the British
connection. 169 The Toronto Daily Star advocated abolition on grounds
of nationalism: "The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council was
established as a colonial court and Canada is not a colony but a self-
governing dominion."' 7 0 The London Free Press decried the lack of
local knowledge of British judges,' 7 ' and the Winnipeg Free Press,
along with most other Western newspapers, advocated abolition. 7 2
The predominant note among those who desired to retain appeals
was that the Judicial Committee was a valuable link binding together
163 P. B. Mignault to Cahan, 14 February, 1939, Cahan Papers.
164 Cahan to P. B. Mignault, 15 February, 1939, Cahan Papers.
165 The Montreal Gazette, Saturday, February 12, 1938, at 6.
166 The Hamilton Spectator, Wednesday, February 9, 1938 at 6.
167 The Toronto Telegram, Friday, April 11, 1938, at 6.
168 The Toronto Globe and Mail, Friday, April 11, 1938, at 6.
169 The Ottawa Journal, Friday, April 11, 1938, at 4.
170 The Toronto Daily Star, Monday, April 21, 1938, at 6.
171 The London Free Press, Monday, April 11, 1938, at 6.
172 Editorial in the Winnipeg Free Press reprinted in the Moose-Jaw
Times Herald, Wednesday, April 23, 1938, at 6. See also the Calgary Albertan,




the British Commonwealth, that British judges were more qualified
than Canadian judges and that the Committee was a more likely
guardian of provincial rights. Opponents of retention generally con-
sidered that independence implied an entirely Canadian judiciary, that
judges on the Judicial Committee were 'out of touch' with local cir-
cumstances, and that a Canadian judiciary would be just as competent
and qualified as the bench in Britain to hear ultimate appeals. In con-
nection with all of these last-mentioned points, the results of the New
Deal cases could be cited persuasively as evidence by Canadian pro-
ponents of abolition.
In January, 1940, the Supreme Court of Canada decided that in
view of the Statute of Westminster, the abolition of appeals was with-
in the constitutional powers of the Dominion. 73 The majority, com-
prising Duff, Rinfret, Kerwin and Hudson, held that the Judicial Com-
mittee was essentially a court of appeal, and contended that by section
101 of the B.N.A. Act1 74 and the residuary clause final jurisdiction
could be conferred on the Supreme Court of Canada. The Court held
that appeals to the Judicial Committee, even from provincial courts
and on provincial points of law, could be prohibited. Crocket and Davis
dissented from the majority opinion, both contending that the Domin-
ion was incompetent to cut off appeals from provincial courts.
After the War, several provinces appealed the decision of the
Supreme Court. Ontario, New Brunswick, British Columbia and Que-
bec argued that the continuation of appeals was a vested provincial
right. On behalf of the Judicial Committee, however, Lord Chancellor
Jowett rejected this contention:
.*. To their Lordships it appears reasonably plain that, since, in the words
used by Lord Robertson in delivering the opinion of the Board in the
Crown Grain Co. case (1908 A.C. 507): 'TFhe subject in conflict belongs pri-
marily to the Dominion Parliament, namely, the establishment of the
Court of Appeal for Canada," to that Parliament also must belong the
power not only to determine in what cases and under what conditions the
appellate jurisdiction of that court may be invoked, but also to deny
appellate jurisdiction to any other court .... 175
The judgment clarified the right of Parliament, since the enactment
of the Statute of Westminster, 1931, to provide for a wholly Canadian
system of appeals, which comprised the right to determine which judi-
cial tribunal would hear ultimate appeals in Canadian cases. The deci-
sion had a highly centralist thrust in as much as it affirmed the right
of the federal government to establish an exclusively Canadian system
of appeals, with the ultimate tribunal being set up under federal law
and having federally-appointed judges. The result, it may be suggested,
173 [19401 1 D.L.R. 289.
174 Section 101 reads: 'The Parliament of Canada may, notwithstanding
anything in this Act, from Time to Time provide for the Constitution, Main-
tenance, and Organization of a General Court of Appeal for Canada, and
for the Establishment of any additional Courts for the better Administration
of the Laws of Canada."
175 Attorney-General for Ontario v. Attorney-General for Canada, [19471
A.C. 153.
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would tend to produce uniformity of law rather than the diversity
characteristic of a more decentralized federalism.
Following the judgment, the Liberals at their national convention
in Ottawa in 1948 pledged to abolish appeals. Before appeals could be
abolished, the general election of 1949 intervened, with the Liberals
winning 193 seats to 42 for the Progressive Conservatives. Although
abolition was not a major issue in the election campaign, the govern-
ment's position was clear and on September 19, 1949, Bill No. 2 was
introduced in the House to make the Supreme Court of Canada the
final court of appeal for the Dominion. A feature of the ensuing parlia-
mentary debate was the attempt by some English-speaking Progres-
sive Conervative M.P.'s, led by Mr. Drew, to have the binding author-
ity of Judicial Committee decisions formally acknowledged in the
Supreme Court Act. This attempt proved abortive, however.17 6 On
December 10, 1949, Bill No. 2 received royal assent; its provisions went
further than Cahan's earlier Bill in that it cut off appeals from all
Canadian courts. 7 7 The controversy following the result of the New
Deal judgments had played a highly significant role in the constitution
of an ultimate domestic court of appeal for Canada.
The Interplay of Judicial and Political Processes
The judicial disposition of the New Deal, because of its political
ramifications, affords an opportunity for the study of the interplay of
judicial and political process in developing the Constitution. The effect
of policy considerations on constitutional development has long been
acknowledged, even by those who, like Mr. Justice Frankfurter, may
often deplore the fact that the policy views of judges become crystal-
lized in judicial decisions. 178
First, as was suggested above, the mechanism of the reference,
which is peculiar to Canada in the Anglo-American legal world, lends
itself to political exploitation. The political overtones will naturally
vary from instance to instance, but with Prime Minister Bennett's
New Deal the genesis of the programme could hardly be ignored by
the judges when they were deliberating on how to deal with the stat-
utes. Finlayson has recounted that he often acted as emissary from
Bennett, now leader of the opposition, to Chief Justice Duff in order
to explain to the latter different features of the programme. Finlayson
added that while Bennett himself would have considered it improper to
approach Duff, he felt no compunction about using his executive secre-
tary as an intermediary and apparently Duff welcomed the informa-
176 See RUSSELL, supra note 29, at 96.
177 Cf. section 54(2) of the Bupreme Court Act, R.S.C. 1952, c. 259,
enacted by 1949 (Can. 2d sess.), c. 37, s. 3: "Notwithstanding any royal pre-
rogative or anything contained in any Act of Parliament of the United King-
dom or any Act of the Parliament of Canada or any Act of the legislature of
any province of Canada or any other statute or law, no appeal lies or shall
be brought from or in respect of the judgment of any court, judge or judicial
officer in Canada to any court of appeal, tribunal or authority by which, in
the United Kingdom, appeals or petitions to Her Majesty in Council may be
ordered to be heard."178 See Frankfurter's judgment in West Virginia State Board of Edu-
cation v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624.
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tion this made available. In addition to clarifying the purposes of the
various statutes, Mr. Finlayson tactfully advised Duff of the reasons
why Bennett considered the legislation intra vires. During his conver-
sations with Duff, Finlayson became aware that the atmosphere of the
Court was saturated with politics - the judges talked of little else
during the hearings and, indeed, this would be hardly surprising in
view of their political backgrounds. 179
When the circumstances of the New Deal references are consid-
ered, it seems obvious that in sending the statutes to the courts for re-
view the government was implicitly asserting that the legislation was
not wanted. The legislation had been criticized by the Liberals both
in Parliament and during the 1935 election campaign, and it consti-
tuted almost a defiant manifesto by which the Conservatives hoped
to snatch probable victory from their opponents in the general elec-
tion. The tendency of the Liberals up to 1935 had not been in the di-
rection of social reform through state intervention in the economy but
of Zaissez-faire, and this would not be the kind of programme that
would appeal to them. The acceptance of the programme, in fact,
would alienate some of their strongest supporters such as Premier
Taschereau of Quebec. It should have been manifest, at least to the
Canadian judiciary, that the executive which had placed the New Deal
in question through the reference device was not a body anxious to
have the statutes sustained.
The launching of references on the New Deal was a purely dis-
cretionary step which it was clear that Bennett himself would not have
taken had he been re-elected in 1935. He had said in Parliament, in
fact, when pressed by the opposition, that he was satisfied of the valid-
ity of the proposed legislation and felt no need for a reference. The
important constituti6nal consequences which flowed from the refer-
ences, therefore, were by no means inevitable. Viewed against the
history of constitutional interpretation of the courts in question, the
decision was one which would at least delay and, very probably, largely
frustrate the implementation of the New Deal. Various alternatives
which were open to the Liberals in 1935 have already been briefly
mentioned.18 ' The judicious employment of some of these alternatives
would have enabled the government to confer the benefits of Bennett's
social legislation on the Canadian people without appearing to accept
the programme of their defeated rivals in a servile fashion.
Once the decision to initiate references had been taken, assuming
that it was not eager to have the statutes upheld, the government could
rely on a Supreme Court bench which was both politically astute and
largely sympathetic. Four members of the seven-man bench had Lib-
eral backgrounds, and three of these four - Rinfret, Cannon and
Lamont - had participated actively in partisan politics. Whereas
Crocket, Kerwin and Davis were Conservatives, only Crocket had a
keenly partisan background and he, of course, although this was
179 Interview with R. K. Finlayson, March 23, 1966.
180 Official Report of Debates, January 29, 1935, at 281.
181 See, The Initiation of the References, supra.
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probably not known to the King government, disliked both Bennett
and Duff and had been deeply antagonized by the Conservative New
Deal, which he considered a contradiction in terms. In the case of an
ultimate appeal to the Judicial Committee it would be impossible to
rely on any significant partisan bias among their Lordships, but the
historical provincialist tendencies of the Board would suggest that
federal counsel would be at a disadvantage when arguing the cases in
London.
In retrospect, it would appear that both Duff and Atkin attempted
to persuade their colleagues to endorse their respective views of judi-
cial policy and that, on the whole, Atkin was more successful. As Atkin
delivered the decisions in all of the major cases, his views were prob-
ably the chief ones behind the more important decisions. Duff, of
course, had to be satisfied with an even division of judges in the treaty
case and defeat in the unemployment insurance reference. Duff's
efforts at judicial leadership were thwarted by hard-core autonomist
opposition from Crocket, Cannon and Rinfret, none of whom would
budge from their strong provincialist positions.
When respective counsel for the Dominion and the provinces are
considered, it should be emphasized that the provinces - especially
Ontario, New Brunswick and British Coumbia - were represented by
highly competent counsel who held deep convictions on the correct-
ness of their stand. Roebuck, McNair and Farris were not only able
advocates, they shared an unshakeable conviction that a federal
victory in the New Deal litigation would involve a major erosion of
provincial power. Dominion counsel, on the other hand, except for
Rowell who was absent during the Judicial Committee hearings, were
not noted for their pre-eminence as constitutional advocates, and had
been retained by a government which was apparently lukewarm con-
cerning their success; their success, indeed, would present the govern-
ment with more problems than their failure. Federal counsel faced
an additional difficulty in that the arguments of the provinces were
mutually supporting whereas they stood alone. The obliqueness of
their argument, moreover, appeared to have a negative effect on the
judges, exposing further vulnerable areas of the federal case to attack
by the bench, and facilitating adverse decisions on side issues.
It is obvious that overseas judges like Thankerton, Rowlatt,
Wright and Atkin,182 who had an excellent knowledge of Scots or
English law would not be equally adept at Canadian constitutional
law. Neither their political background nor their training fitted them
for the exacting task of rendering competent decisions on the Cana-
dian Constitution. In adumbrating the large policy component in con-
stitutional cases, for instance in the treaty cases, British judges would
be at an even greater disadvantage than in attempting to arrive at
182 Lord Macmillan, as has been mentioned, was more conversant than
his brethren with Canadian law and social conditions. It is not altogether
impossible, however, that Scottish 'autonomists' like Macmillan and Thanker-
ton might have had considerable sympathy for provincial autonomists like
McNair, Roebuck and Farris.
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legal decisions in the more restricted sense. It may be argued, in fact,
that in the elaboration of policy, local political and social experience is
of inestimably greater importance than academic knowledge of the
law.
The administrative disposition of the statutes which were upheld
may provide an important indication of the government's attitude to
the New Deal as a whole. In the case of the Farmers' Creditors
Arrangement Act, the government first restricted the operation of
the statute to the three prairie provinces, and by a further amend-
ment provided that any farmer might invoke the Act only once. And
the other major statute which was upheld, The Dominion Trade and
Industry Commission Act, was invoked only sporadically, since the
Liberals preferred to work through their own Combines Investigation
Act, and was finally repealed in 1949. Those New Deal statutes which
were not nullified during the adjudicative phase of the litigation,
accordingly, were curtailed or frustrated entirely during the post-
adjudicative phase.
Throughout the whole New Deal process, from the inception of
the programme in 1934 and 1935 to its virtual invalidation in 1937
the intermingling of legal and political factors was manifest. This is
inevitable in constitutional development, for although politics and law
can be conceptually segregated, in any constitutional evolution they
are inseparable. Since constitutional law in a federal state reflects
compromises among various regional groupings, along with a common
acknowledgment that certain functions are best performed by the
central authority, perhaps the most important lesson to be learned
from the New Deal is the need to have jurists on the highest court
who are both proficient judges, and broad enough in outlook to balance
national against regional interests. While particular evaluations of
the New Deal judgments will fluctuate with the varying policy views
of the observer, it might be suggested that certain of the New Deal
judges had a fixity of viewpoint that precluded the realistic balancing
of regional against national interests.
The New Deal is surely one of the most instructive examples
of how politicians, political parties and courts may operate conjointly
in the development of a federal constitution. In certain respects,
however, it is not typical of other constitutional litigation and one
should not make broad generalizations carelessly from the New Deal
example. It is set apart from some other cases, for example, because
it commenced with references under section 55 of the Supreme Court
Act whereas other constitutional cases were adversary proceedings of
the more usual type between the Dominion and the provinces. 183 The
almost clinical detachment from concrete social circumstances that
was present in the New Deal litigation, and the general public apathy
concerning its fate, sets it apart from other constitutional issues
embedded in a real, rather than a hypothetical, context. The sharp-
183 This is not to say, however, that constitutional references have been
infrequent. Professor Russell has found that nearly half of the constitutional
adjudication by the Judicial Committee in the three decades before 1949
involved reference cases, See RussnLL, supra note 99, at xxv.
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ness of the political controversy on the subject matter before the
litigation and the decisive defeat of the government sponsoring the
legislation just before the references were sent to the courts are
other elements setting it apart from more prosaic constitutional
quarrels. However, the co-mingling of legal and extra-legal factors,
of law and politics, is characteristic of most constitutional disputes.
The composition and the social and political sympathies of the judi-
ciary, the forensic abilities of opposing counsel, the precise definition
of the issues in the factums and oral argument, the care and skill with
which judiciary approaches its task, along with the actual configura-
tion of the political forces supporting and opposing the legislation may
have a significant effect on the result. While these variables will differ
in every case, an examination of the New Deal supplies instructive
examples of the influence of some of these factors on constitutional
decision-making.
